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God in the Machine: A New Structural
Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine
Matthew J. Sag
Abstract
This article is a broad reconceptualization of the role of fair use within copyright
law. Fair use is commonly thought of as just one of many exceptions limiting
copyright, in contrast, this article shows that fair use has actually enabled the ex-
pansion of copyright protection. Fair use has an important structural role that is
often overlooked. First, copyright necessarily must balance intellectual property
incentives with the protection of free speech and innovation; fair use constitutes
that balancing mechanism. By establishing the outer limits of copyright, fair use
in fact enables an expansive interpretation of author’s rights within those bounds.
Second, because copyright works best by providing flexible principles that can
accommodate technological changes, fair use also constitutes the mechanism by
which Congress has given the courts a large policy making role to ensure copy-
right’s balance. This article explains this structural function of fair use, then shows
how this theory should and does apply. In doing so, it also identifies two broad
trends emerging in the case law that have previously not been recognized or artic-
ulated, despite their significance. These are the principles of consumer autonomy
and medium neutrality.
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Introduction 
Yes, yes, our program just insinuated that George Pataki had a big, gay 
experience on the Staten Island Ferry. This is the beauty of  fair use.1
Fair use plays a vital but misunderstood role in copyright law. The central dilemma 
for fair use jurisprudence is that without the flexibility of  fair use, copyright would become 
unwieldy and oppressive; but if  fair use allows too much freedom from copyright, it risks 
undermining the incentives that the creators of  copyrighted works rely on. Typically, scholars 
express concern about one or the other half  of  this problem as determined by their policy 
preferences. This article puts aside outcome driven analysis and examines the larger role fair 
use serves within copyright law. It identifies two structural purposes embodied by fair use, 
one determining the shifting balance of  copyright law, the other determining policy making 
authority over copyright law. First, fair use bounds copyright rights, and in doing so it 
enables expansive definition of  those rights within those bounds. Second, fair use has 
allowed Congress to delegate to the courts the difficult policy decisions as to the details of  
copyright owners’ rights.  
Many scholars have warned, with increasing urgency, that we are approaching the 
“tyranny of  copyright.”2 This dark vision of  a “permission culture” argues that our “creative 
ecosystem” is under threat because of  certain legal and technological changes that have 
increased the rights of  copyright owners.3 The potential tyranny of  copyright stems from the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
* Matthew Sag is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Northwestern University School of  
Law. Thanks to David Dana, Shari Diamond, Tonja Jacobi and the participants at the Northwestern 
University School of  Law’s Zodiac forum for their many helpful comments. Thanks also to Oren 
Bracha, Marc Gergan, Tony Reece and Larry Sager for their comments on a much earlier draft.  
1. The Daily Show with John Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast, Aug. 3, 
2004). 
2. Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of  Copyright?, N.Y Times, Jan. 25, 2004; see also, 
Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock 
Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and 
the Construction of  the Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Yochai Benkler, 
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of  the Public Domain, 
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999). 
3. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 130.  
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combination of  (1) our reliance on access to and use of  existing works and (2) the 
increasingly pervasive “ownership” claimed with respect to those works. Consumers and 
creators rely on access to existing works, not just in artistic fields but in countless areas of  
social, political, cultural and economic activity. Most of  the fabric of  our cultural and 
intellectual lives is owned in some fashion by someone else.4
These concerns are not without foundation, but they are overstated because one 
person’s claim of  ownership with respect to a work says very little about what others can in 
fact do with that work.  Significantly, copyright ownership claims are contingent upon the 
application of  fair use. Reliance on owned works does not necessarily preordain a life of  
intellectual servitude. The alleged tyranny of  copyright is mitigated in part because copyright 
claims are limited by fair use. In the landmark Sony decision, the Supreme Court held that 
home video taping of  broadcast television programs was not an infringement of  copyright.5 
Ownership of  the copyright in the subject broadcasts was undisputed; what was disputed 
were the implications of  that ownership. By a five to four majority the Court held that time-
shifting by consumers was fair use and thus not copyright infringement.6 The majority 
reached this conclusion in spite of  the fact that consumers were copying entire programs 
without the permission of  the copyright owners. The majority also held that Sony, the maker 
of  the VCR, was not liable for contributory infringement because time-shifting constituted a 
substantial noninfringing use for the product.7 Copyright ownership did not make copying 
by end users unlawful, and it did not make the VCR an unlawful device.  
Sony has become the poster-child decision for both consumers who believe they 
have a right to copy and for businesses that provide tools or services related to consumer 
copying. However, recent attempts by internet music pioneers Napster and MP3.com to 
extend Sony into the internet age both failed.8 These cases, and many others, highlight the 
uncertainty of  fair use, especially in the context of  new technology. Under the current state 
of  the law, consumers, entrepreneurs, academics, journalists and copyright owners often 
cannot know with certainty what will, and what will not, be deemed fair use without all the 
joy and expense of  federal litigation.  
The uncertain scope of  fair use undermines its ability to effectively guard the public 
interest in legitimate access to, and use of, copyrighted works. For example, without fair use, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4. Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2003, at A16. “The copyright 
system, though constitutional, is broken. It effectively and perpetually protects nearly all material that 
anyone would want to cite or use. That’s not what the framers envisioned, and it’s not in the public 
interest.” 
5. Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG 
Recordings v. MP3.Com Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 ([district] 2000). 
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some documentaries would never be produced.9 Even with the fair use doctrine, the chilling 
effect of  potential litigation may discourage many who could otherwise rely on the doctrine. 
Recognition of  the structural role of  fair use has the potential to mitigate some of  
the uncertainty of  current fair use jurisprudence. The statutory framework for fair use both 
mitigates and causes uncertainty. It mitigates uncertainty by providing a consistent 
framework of  analysis – the four statutory factors. However, when judges apply the statutory 
factors without articulating or justifying their own assumptions, they increase uncertainty. 
The statutory factors mean nothing without certain a priori assumptions as to the scope of  
the copyright owner’s rights; a more stable and predictable fair use jurisprudence would 
begin to emerge if  those assumptions were made more transparently and coherently. This is 
the focus of  Part I.  
Part II describes the changes in copyright law brought about by the Copyright Act of  
1976. Copyright skeptics regard the 1976 Act as an unwarranted expansion of  copyright 
rights, constituting a triumph of  special interest politics over the public good and common 
sense. Part II argues that, whatever the politics might have been, the shift to a dynamic 
system of  copyright rights was a justified response to the combined problems of  legislative 
gridlock and the expectation of  continued technological and social change.  
Part III, the heart of  this article, examines the structural role of  fair use in the 
context of  an evolving copyright system. Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of  
expansive copyright rights are bound to be disappointed. Rather, it is argued that fair use is a 
structural tool that allows copyright to adapt to changing circumstances. This article 
establishes this argument in two stages. First, recognition that the structural role of  fair use is 
to enable broader more flexible rights to be vested in the copyright owner. Second, it shows 
that in order to preserve copyright’s ability to adapt to new technology, fair use must remain 
a somewhat open-ended standard developed by the judiciary through the imperfect process 
of  common law adjudication. 
Ultimately, the assumptions as to the proper scope of  the copyright owner’s rights 
can only be developed by deriving fundamental principles from copyright law itself. Exactly 
what those fundamental principles might be is obviously a matter of  debate; but it is much 
narrower debate than that which is required by reference to normative conceptions of  the 
good in general; and it is much more likely to result in stability and predictability in fair use 
jurisprudence than any of  the cost-benefit approaches advocated in the literature. The 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on transformativeness in its most recent fair use decision, 
Campbell v. Acuff  Rose,10 is an important step toward a more coherent fair use doctrine; 
however, there are additional steps to be taken and other fundamental principles within 
copyright law beyond its preference for transformative uses. This recommendation is the 
subject of  Part IV. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9. Robert Greenwald’s Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War 
([production company] 2004), and Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch’s War on Journalism ([production 
company] 2004) (both rely on fair use); see Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting The President, Wired, 
12.08, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.08/view.html?pg=5. 
10. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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There are three principles of  copyright law over and above transformativeness that 
judges can apply to give substance to the structural role of  fair use. The first is the well 
established principle of  the idea expression distinction. Recent case law suggests two other 
principles are emerging, but have yet to be articulated. These are the principles of  consumer 
autonomy and medium neutrality. This article identifies these trends and their potential to 
provide a more principled and consistent basis for fair use analysis.  
Part I—The Limits of  Statutory Guidance on Fair Use 
The difficulty of  adjudicating fair use cases is well established. Almost every 
comment on the subject notes that fair use is “one of  the most troublesome [doctrines] in 
the whole law of  copyright.”11 One of  the central difficulties of  fair use jurisprudence is the 
indeterminacy of  the statutory factors. The statutory codification of  the fair use doctrine 
requires courts to consider four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose 
and character of  the use; (2) the nature of  the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of  the portion taken; and (4) the effect of  the use upon the potential market 
for, or value of, the copyrighted work.12  
The statutory factors provide a useful framework for analysis, but their limitations 
must be explicitly recognized. The core limitation of  the factors is that in order to determine 
their application one must make an a priori assumption as to the scope of  the rights of  the 
copyright owner. The challenge for fair use jurisprudence is to find a rational and consistent 
basis for those assumptions – the first step in that process is to admit that assumptions are 
being made. The current practice of  most courts, treating the factors as outcome-
determinative as opposed to question-framing, masks a priori assumptions and distorts 
judicial reasoning.  
Some commentators question whether the factors are relevant at all. David Nimmer’s 
study of  the relevance of  the four factors concludes that they are not outcome-
determinative, either individually or collectively.13 Nimmer surveyed the application of  each 
of  the four factors in 60 fair use cases decided between 1994 and 2003.14 According to 
Nimmer’s (admittedly subjective) assessment, the factors corresponded with the ultimate 
finding only 55% , 42%, 57% and 50% of  cases respectively.15 Even in the few cases in 
which all four factors appeared to line up in the same direction, either fair or unfair, they still 
had no predictive value.16 From Nimmer’s perspective, the four factors uniformly pointed to 
one conclusion in eleven of  the sixty cases, however, that clean sweep only corresponded 
with the actual result in six of  those cases; i.e. in 54% of  cases. “Basically, had Congress 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11. Dellar v Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939). 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (date). 
13. David Nimmer, “Fairest of  Them All” And Other Fairytales of  Fair Use, 66 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 263, 280 (2003). 
14. Id. at 268. 
15. Id. at 280. 
16. Id. 282–284. 
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legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the 
Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same.”17  
Nimmer’s findings must be treated with some caution because litigated cases may not 
tell us anything about the broader universe of  fair use disputes.18 Nonetheless, Nimmer’s 
findings provide rudimentary support for this article’s contention that the four statutory 
factors are largely incapable of  determining the outcome of  fair use cases in any objective 
sense. The next four subsections briefly review the statutory factors to demonstrate that they 
are not outcome-determinative and that significant assumptions must be made before the 
factors can be applied.  
A. Purpose and Character of  the Use 
The first factor as to whether a use of  a work is a fair use is “the purpose and 
character of  the use, including whether such use is of  a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”19 The law in with respect to this factor has weaved a 
curious path. Commercial uses have been held fair,20 educational uses have not.21 The 
Supreme Court’s comment that there are no bright line rules for applying the fair use 
doctrine,22 appears, if  anything, to be an understatement.  
In 1984, the Supreme Court majority in Sony declared that “every commercial use of  
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation”23 In 1994, the Court was asked 
to adjudicate the fairness of  2 Live Crew’s indisputably commercial parody of  an old Roy 
Orbison song in Campbell. In that case, the Court held that there was no presumption that 
commercial use was unfair. As the Court observed, “[any such presumption] would swallow 
nearly all of  the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of  § 107, including news 
reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities . . . 
which are generally conducted for profit.”24  
The Campbell decision also marked another more subtle departure from Sony 
concerning the purpose and character of  the use. In Sony, the majority categorically reversed 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the absence of  a productive use precluded the application of  
                                                                                                                                                                             
17. Id. at 280. 
18. See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection Of  Disputes For Litigation, 13 
Journal of  Legal Studies 1 (1984).  
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (date). 
20. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994).  
21. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(unauthorized reproduction of  copyrighted works in university course packs not fair use); Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same). Madey v. Duke  also 
illustrates the uncertain privileges of  educational institutions in the context of  patent law’s 
experimental use doctrine; see Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir., 2002).  
22. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
23. Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
24. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
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fair use.25 “Productive use” in this context means that the use leads to the creation of  a new 
work which results “in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first 
author’s work.”26 According to the Ninth Circuit decision, convenience, entertainment and 
increased access were not purposes within the general scope of  fair use.27 In Sony, the 
majority of  the Supreme Court held that the productive/unproductive distinction could 
never be determinative of  fair use.28  
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Campbell substantially reintroduced the 
productivity requirement under another name—the key question now being whether the 
allegedly infringing use is “transformative.” Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of  the 
Court, explained that the central purpose of  the fair use investigation was to determine: 
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of  the original . . . or 
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is transformative.29  
For Justice Souter, transformative works “lie at the heart of  the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of  breathing space within the confines of  copyright.”30 Accordingly, while 
unproductive or untransformative uses are not to be presumptively denied fair use 
protection, the heart of  the doctrine is reserved for “transformative” uses. The dominance 
of  the transformativeness test makes the actual statutory language regarding non-
commercial and educational uses largely irrelevant.31  
Also, the extent to which a use is “transformative” is clearly a meta-factor: the extent 
to which a use transforms the work cannot be determined without reference to the other 
factors, such as the nature of  the original work, the quantitative and qualitative similarity 
between the works and the effect of  the use on the value of  the original work. The merits 
and limitations of  transformativeness are discussed in Part IV below. The purpose of  the 
defendant’s use is still important, it is just as clearly a subjective determination. Bright-line 
distinctions, such as commercial/non-commercial and educational/non-educational, have 
been superceded by a much more ambiguous notion, transformativeness.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
25. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of  Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971–972 (9th Cir. 1981). 
26. Sony, 464 U.S. at 478 (Blackmun dissent). 
27. Universal, 659 F.2d at 970. 
28. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.  
29. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotes and citations omitted); see also, Pierre 
Leval, Towards A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
30. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
31. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir. 
1996) (Circuit Judge Merritt, dissenting). 
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B. Nature of  the Copyrighted Work  
The second factor considered by the courts in applying the fair use standard is “the 
nature of  the copyrighted work.”32 Two aspects of  the nature of  the work are important to 
consider: whether the work is factual as opposed to creative; and whether the work is 
published or unpublished.  
In principle, the more creative the original work is, the more justification is required 
to establish a fair use in relation to it.33 Anecdotally, this aspect of  the nature of  the work 
tends not to be regarded as significant.34 The Supreme Court did not consider the creative 
nature of  television programs or musical compositions to be an obstacle to a finding of  fair 
use in Sony or Campbell. At the other end of  the spectrum, the Second Circuit has held that 
the copying of  one factual work by a rival was not protected by fair use.35 The second factor 
is especially unhelpful in cases involving parody, because parody is predicated on the 
existence of  an antecedent creative work. As the Supreme Court noted in Campbell, in the 
context of  parody, the second factor “is not much help . . . in separating the fair use sheep 
from the infringing goats.”36
After the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Harper & Row v. Nation 
Enterprises,37 it briefly appeared that use of  an unpublished work could almost never qualify 
as fair use.38 The Nation had published a 300 to 400-word extract of  the soon-to-be 
published memoirs of  President Gerald Ford dealing with the Nixon pardon, preempting an 
article that was scheduled to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed to purchase the 
exclusive right to print pre-publication excerpts of  President Ford’s memoir; but as a result 
of  the defendant’s article, Time canceled its agreement. The majority held that “[u]nder 
ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public appearance of  his 
undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of  fair use.”39  
Two cases from the Second Circuit followed and enlarged this ruling. In Salinger v 
Random House,40 the Second Circuit held that a literary biographer of  reclusive author J.D. 
Salinger was not permitted to quote from a selection of  Salinger’s unpublished letters and 
drafts. In New Era v Holt,41 the same court held that the quotation of  unpublished material 
                                                                                                                                                                             
32. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (date).  
33. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
34. According to Nimmer’s analysis, it actually has a negative correlation with the 
outcome. Nimmer, Fairest Of  Them All, supra note 13, at 280. 
35. Financial Information, Inc v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
36. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
37. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
38. Id. at 555. 
39. Id. at 555. 
40. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
41. New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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to establish a variety of  critical assertions with respect to L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of  
Scientology, was equally unavailing on fair use grounds.42 In both cases the court held that 
unpublished works normally enjoy “complete protection against copying any protected 
expression.”43
In 1992 Congress revised Section 107 and made it clear that “[t]he fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself  bar a finding of  fair use if  such finding is made upon 
consideration of  all the above factors.”44 In light of  Congress’ clarification of  Section 107, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row is easier to reconcile as deriving from the 
fact that the work in question was soon-to-be published, not that it was unpublished.45 In 
any event, the nature of  the copyrighted work remains unhelpful in assessing whether an 
activity is protected by fair use or not. 
C. Amount And Substantiality of  the Portion Used 
The third factor to be considered in adjudicating fair use is “the amount and 
substantiality of  the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”46 The need 
for both a quantitative and a qualitative inquiry harks back to Justice Story’s original 
formulation of  the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh.47 In that case, Justice Story was 
concerned to protect the “chief  value of  the original work” against the extraction of  its 
“essential parts” through the mere “facile use of  scissors” or its intellectual equivalent.48 In 
theory, the greater the portion of  a work that is copied, the less inclined a court will be to 
find in favor of  fair use. In practice, several cases confound this basic proposition, relying 
instead on subjective qualitative impressions or suppositions as to the value of  the work.  
In Harper & Row, the defendant copied a mere 300 words from a 200,000-word 
manuscript, yet the Supreme Court held that this constituted a substantial taking under the 
third factor.49 This extraordinary conclusion only makes sense in context of  the Court’s 
manifest disapproval of  the conduct of  the defendant, particularly the manner in which it 
obtained access to an advance copy of  the biography and its scoop of  the Time magazine 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42. Id.
43. Salinger, 811 F.2d 90; New Era Publications, 873 F.2d at 583; see also Leval, supra 
note 29, at 1113. 
44. Amended 10/24/92 by Pub. L. No. 102-492. 
45. Leval, supra note 29, at 1120. Note that Judge Leval authored both the Salinger and 
New Era opinions overturned by the Second Circuit: Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev’d & rem’d 811 F.2d 90, (2d Cir. 1987) and New Era Publications International, 
ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 ([S]D.N.Y., 1988) aff ’d on other grounds 873 F.2d 576 
(2d Cir. 1989).  
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (3) ([date]). 
47. 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
48. Id. at 345. 
49. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). The 
words were not even entirely sequential, see Edward Samuels, The Illustrated Story Of  
Copyright 155 (2000). 
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story. In Sony, the majority of  the Supreme Court found that home videotaping entire 
programs for later viewing was fair use.50 In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that even 
though rap musicians 2 Live Crew had copied the heart of  the original Roy Orbison song – 
the first line of  lyrics and characteristic opening bass riff  – nonetheless, the defendant’s 
appropriation could be protected by fair use.51 The Court reasoned that copying the heart of  
the song was excusable because it is the heart which most readily conjures up the song for 
parody, and also because it is the heart at which parody generally takes aim.52  
The point to be understood is not that the amount of  the work used is never 
significant; but rather that while the third factor provides a convenient platform for 
bolstering existing conclusions, it provides little ex ante guidance. The question of  qualitative 
significance is inextricably tied with the fourth factor because each requires the court to 
assess the “value” of  the original work. The third factor does not rely on mechanical 
quantification of  the amount of  the original work used, it asks courts to asses how much of  
the value of  the original work is present in the later use. Similarly, the fourth factor asks what 
the effect the later use will have on the value of  the original work. Thus both the third and 
forth factors require the determination of  the antecedent question – the value of  the work. 
In each case, the value of  the original can only be determined with reference to scope of  the 
copyright owner’s rights of  exclusion; treating the statutory factors as outcome-
determinative, as opposed to question-framing, ask us to believe the opposite is true.  
D. Market Effect 
The fourth statutory factor in fair use analysis is “the effect of  the use upon the 
potential market for or value of  the copyrighted work.”53 In short, the fourth factor asks 
“what is the market effect of  the unauthorized use?” It is worth exploring this factor in 
some detail, first because it is sometimes said to be the most important factor,54 and second 
because questions of  market effect dominate academic literature. Assessing the market effect 
of  an unauthorized use confronts judges with a potential circularity: while their ultimate 
ruling defines the scope of  the market, they are supposed to examine the market effect in 
making that ruling. In other words, they must make a ruling based on a finding that is 
contingent on their ruling. This theoretical circularity is mitigated by the reality that judges 
begin with a view as to the proper scope of  the copyright owner’s rights and then apply the 
statutory factors in a manner that transforms those priors into conclusions.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
50. Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984). 
51. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994). 
52. Id.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) ([date]). 
54. The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on fair use warns that the statutory 
factors are not to be treated in isolation, rather “[a]ll are to be explored, and the results weighed 
together, in light of  the purposes of  copyright.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; but see Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 566 (fourth factor undoubtedly single most important element of  fair use); Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (factors not created equal, 
fourth factor at least primus inter pares). 
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As a preliminary matter, it is clear that analysis of  market effect must include the 
effect on the copyright owner’s continued exploitation of  existing markets and her potential 
exploitation of  markets she is yet to enter.55 If  unexploited markets were left to fair users by 
default, copyright owners would find themselves in a race to exploit their works in as many 
markets as possible to preserve their future rights. The author of  a novel would rush to 
make some token exploitation in every context imaginable; from the plausible (sequels, 
screen-plays, and television series) to the unlikely (soft toys, action figures, and private-label 
credit cards).  
Although considering potential and derivative markets is clearly necessary, it raises 
the problem that copyright owners can claim that almost any new use of  their work is part 
of  an unexplored derivative market. For example, although it had shown no interest in 
licensing a derivative of  “Pretty Woman” in the rap genre before its lawsuit against 2 Live 
Crew, Acuff  Rose (Roy Orbison’s publisher) argued that 2 Live Crew’s parody diminished its 
potential to do so. The Supreme Court lent credence to these kinds of  argument by 
remanding the case in Campbell to the district court to determine whether the 2 Live Crew 
parody had dampened the potential demand for non-parody derivatives of  the original song 
in the rap genre, a market hitherto unexplored by the copyright owner.56
The uncertainty of  the original work’s potential market necessitates defining the 
limits of  that market in order to ascertain whether the allegedly infringing use has any effect 
on it. This encourages a kind of  circular reasoning: findings of  fair use are premised on 
narrow market definitions; while denials of  fair use are premised on expansive market 
definitions. The reasoning is circular because although the fair use question determines the 
extent of  the market, the extent of  the market also determines the outcome of  the fair use 
question.  
Two cases concerning photocopying illustrate the potential circularity of  examining 
the effect of  the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. In both Williams 
& Wilkins Co. v. United States,57 and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,58 academic 
journal publishers alleged that their copyrights were infringed by defendants making 
unauthorized photocopies of  journal articles for medical and scientific research. The two 
cases, decided almost 20 years apart, are barely distinguishable on their core facts, and yet 
reach entirely opposite conclusions.  
The difference between the cases lies in the latter court’s willingness to find that the 
publisher suffered an adverse market effect. The Court of  Claims in Williams & Wilkins held 
that the evidence on the record failed to show that the defendant’s photocopying practices 
caused a significant detriment to the plaintiff. In American Geophysical, the Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                                                                             
55. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593–594. 
56. Id. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to hear evidence as to 
the likely effect on the market for a non-parody, rap version of  original song. It is puzzling to 
consider what evidence the Court thought would be produced. See 4–13 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.05. 
57. 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (1973) aff ’d by equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
58. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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also concluded that, based on potential sales of  additional journal subscriptions, back issues, 
and back volumes alone, the evidence of  an adverse market effect was weak.59 However, the 
majority of  the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff  prevailed on the fourth factor 
because of  the availability of  licensing facilitated through the Copyright Clearance Center 
(“CCC”).60 The majority found that through this collection organization, the publishers had 
created “a workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce 
their own copies of  individual articles via photocopying.”61 In the opinion of  the majority, 
the potential licensing revenues that would be forgone by publishers if  a finding of  fair use 
was made itself constituted an adverse market effect under the fourth factor. 
Any copyright owner who loses an infringement action because of  a finding of  fair 
use has also lost at least one potential licensee, although in some cases the prospects of  a 
license are more theoretical than real.62 The majority in American Geophysical argued its 
reliance on potential licensing revenues was not circular because: “[o]nly an impact on 
potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets 
should be legally cognizable when evaluating a secondary use’s effect upon the potential 
market for or value of  the copyrighted work.”63  
However, the addition of  the “traditional, reasonable, or likely” requirement does 
not entirely mitigate the problem of  circular reasoning. Determining whether a market is 
“traditional, reasonable, or likely” is indistinguishable from determining the scope of  the 
copyright holder’s rights: both require courts to make an a priori assumption and then 
compare that assumption to the conduct of  the defendant. The Second Circuit comes close 
to transparency in American Geophysical by at least identifying the assumption that it is 
making— that journal photocopying falls within the traditional, reasonable, and likely to be 
developed market of  the copyright owner—but it does little to actually justify this 
assumption.  
Such assumptions should be carefully considered, especially in the context of  market 
effect, because of  the danger that courts will reason backwards from the fact of  
marketability to the construct of  property.64 The CCC was established in 1977 to license 
                                                                                                                                                                             
59. Id. at 928. 
60. Id. at 929. 
61. Id. at 930. 
62. In several prominent cases it appears that the plaintiffs were unwilling to license at 
any price, whereas, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell a settlement including an ongoing 
license was in fact negotiated. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of  God v. Philadelphia Church of  God, 
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d 
Cir. 1989); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); and Rosemont Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).  
63. American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
64. Julie Cohen makes this criticism in relation to the INS case in which the Supreme 
Court found a quasi-property right in news based on a misappropriation theory. Julie E. Cohen, 
Lochner In Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy Of  “Rights Management,” 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 462, 507–508; see also Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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photocopying after the decision in Williams & Wilkins.65 This begs the question: if  a 
centralized clearinghouse was established to license parody, review or reference to a class of  
works, would it establish the existence of  a “traditional,” “reasonable,” or “likely” market for 
such activities?66 In Campbell, the Court held that there is no protectable derivative market 
for criticism, including parody because: 
[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of  
original works would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the 
unlikelihood that creators of  imaginative works will license critical reviews or 
lampoons of  their own productions removes such uses from the very notion 
of  a potential licensing market.67
If  the members of  the MPAA established a rights clearing center for reviews and 
parodies of, and references to their movies, would unauthorized review, reference and parody 
suddenly cease to be fair use? There may be good reasons to not give copyright owners to 
expand control over certain uses of  their works, even if  they are offering to license those 
uses.  
As with the third factor, the fourth factor is conceptually important but incomplete. 
In order to determine market effect, a court must first form some idea as to what the market 
is, as emphasized by the Second Circuit’s holding that the market in question must be 
traditional, reasonable or likely to develop. The problem with the fourth factor, and with all 
the factors to some extent, is that they focus on second order questions and invite courts to 
gloss over the real basis for their rulings – how they came to define the boundaries of  the 
copyright owner’s rights in the first place.68 To answer this antecedent question, courts must 
look beyond the statutory guidance in Section 107 and confront theoretical questions about 
the nature of  copyright.  
E. The Search For Reasons  
The four statutory factors that courts must consider in deciding fair use cases 
provide a useful framework for analysis but they are far from complete. By mandating that 
all decisions in this area at least consider the factors, the statute generates more fine-grained 
                                                                                                                                                                             
65. It is tempting to speculate that had the CCC existed earlier, the decision in Williams 
& Wilkins would have been the same as American Geophysical. However, this seems unlikely. The 
Court of  Claims considered and rejected the possibility of  licensing schemes. In his dissenting 
opinion in American Geophysical, Justice Jacobs argued that the CCC scheme was “neither 
traditional nor reasonable; and its development into a real market is subject to substantial 
impediments.” American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs J. dissent). 
66. American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs J. dissent); see also Lydia Pallas 
Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of  Copyright Permission 
Systems, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 38–39 (1997). 
67. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (emphasis added). 
68. Lloyd Weinreb argues that although the Supreme Court cast its analysis in Sony and 
Harper & Row almost entirely in terms of  the statutory factors, “the application, not to say the 
interpretation, of  the factors is so tailored to the circumstances of  the cases, that one is impelled to 
look beneath the surface of  the opinions for the true ground of  decision.” Lloyd L. Weinreb, The 
1998 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, Fair Use, 4 Fordham L. Rev. 1291, 1299- (1999). 
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points of  comparison. All other things being equal, this should make fair use decisions more 
consistent. However, judges need to recognize that the factors only provide a framework for 
their analysis by raising certain second order questions. Applying the factors still requires 
making first order assumptions as to the scope and value of  the copyright owner’s rights. 
This is particularly true of  the third and fourth factors, which require courts to first define 
the value of  the copyrighted work, in order to determine how much of  the value of  the 
work was used by the defendant, and also to determine how the value of  the work was 
affected by the defendant’s use. Neither of  these questions can be answered without first 
deciding what the value of  the work is in the abstract, or how far the copyright owner’s 
rights in relation to it should extend.  
Courts inevitably fall back on assumptions as to what the legitimate scope of  the 
copyright owners’ rights should be. More precise articulation and more coherent justification 
of  those assumptions should lead to more predictable fair use decisions over time because, 
to the extent that judges agree on these first order considerations, clearer rules will emerge. 
Even where judges initially disagree, such disagreements will be resolved by the usual 
considerations of  precedent.  
The remainder of  this paper considers what kind of  assumptions courts should be 
making in fair use cases. As Parts II and III elaborate, the fundamental starting point for the 
assumptions that fill the gaps in the statutory factors is an understanding of  the dynamic 
nature of  modern copyright law and the structural role of  fair use. Part IV examines the 
jurisprudential implications of  the structural analysis of  fair use and recommends that judges 
should justify their assumptions as to the proper scope of  the copyright owner’s rights in 
terms of  fundamental principles derived from copyright law itself. This bounded normative 
inquiry is more likely to result in stability and predictability than either a simple cost-benefit 
or unrestricted reference to normative conceptions of  the good in general.  
Part II—Copyright as an Evolving System 
As noted in the previous part, the statutory formulation of  the fair use doctrine 
raises significantly more questions than it answers. The indeterminacy of  the statutory 
factors stems from congressional recognition of  the desirability of  judicial policy making. 
Fair use is the mechanism by which Congress transferred significant policy making power to 
judges in order to allow copyright to adapt to ongoing social and technological change more 
effectively than a purely legislative response would allow. Doctrinal recommendations that do 
not take account of  this structural role of  fair use are necessarily limited in their descriptive 
or prescriptive analysis. Some of  these attempts and their weaknesses are considered Part IV. 
Understanding the structural role of  fair use in copyright law is the first step towards 
developing a more coherent fair use doctrine. This part examines the overall structure of  
modern copyright law as the context for understanding the structural role of  fair use.  
The Copyright Act of  1976 can be seen as the culmination of  the transformation of  
American copyright law, from the regulation of  literal reproduction to a system of  general 
rights which protects the more abstract notion of  the value of  creative and intellectual 
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works.69 This transformation has greatly expanded the number of  works covered by 
copyright, and the political and economic significance of  the rights that copyright vests in 
authors and their assignees. Copyright’s transformation and associated expansion have been 
viewed with alarm by many in the academic community because of  the perceived threat to 
free speech, innovation and creativity.70 The expansion of  copyright has also been criticized 
as a victory for special interests – publishers, broadcasters, the recording industry and movie 
studios – over the generalized public interest in the free exchange of  information.71  
Without necessarily disputing any of  these claims, this article tells another story 
about the significance of  the changes in the structure of  American copyright law. The effects 
of  copyright law are prone to technological disruption. Even preceding the digital age, new 
technology such as the juke box and the photocopier conflicted with people’s settled 
expectations of  the rights of  copyright owners and the freedoms of  the public. In 1976, 
Congress decided to alter the structure of  copyright law to make it more responsive to 
technological change. Congress replaced potentially limited and technologically specific 
rights with rights that were more broadly expressed, in order to allow copyright law to be 
more flexible in its treatment of  new technologies. 
The 1976 Act was a significant departure from its predecessor in a number of  
respects. Three changes greatly increased the number of  works subject to copyright and the 
duration of  copyright protection for those works. First, the new Act changed the default rule 
for the application of  copyright, from opt-in to opt-out. Under the 1909 Act, an eligible 
work received no federal copyright protection until its publication, and even then only if  
certain formalities were observed.72 In contrast, the 1976 Act applies to all eligible works 
from the moment of  their creation, although until 1989 it was still the case that a work 
published without the proper form of  copyright notice would instantly become part of  the 
public domain.73 Second, the new Act increased the maximum duration of  copyright 
protection from 56 years from the date of  publication, to the life of  the author plus 50 years 
for most natural persons and 75 years from the year of  first publication for anonymous 
U of M Law School Publications Center, April 28, 2005, 1:49 PM 
                                                                                                                                                                             
69. Oren Bracha, From Privilege To Print To Ownership Of  Works: The 
Transformation Of  American Copyright Law 1790–1909 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University Law School) (on file with author). 
70. See, e.g., Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2; Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking 
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of  the Public Domain, [?]66 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 173 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 
283 (1996).  
71. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 53 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright 
Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html.  
72. The 1909 Act expressly allowed the state common law copyright to protect 
unpublished works. 
73. Jessica Litman, Sharing And Stealing, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1, 15 
(2004); See, e.g., J. A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) 
(copyright void for failure to comply with the formalities). 
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works, pseudonymous works and works made for hire.74 Third, the new Act jettisoned the 
requirement of  copyright renewal, thus extending copyright protection even more 
significantly for the vast majority of  owners who failed to renew their terms after the initial 
28 year period.75 The cumulative effect of  these extensions was that more works were 
protected by copyright and that copyright protection lasted considerably longer.  
Although these changes are significant, there was a much more fundamental change 
to the nature of  copyright itself: the broadening of  the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 
The 1976 Act significantly increased the scope of  copyright owner’s rights by rephrasing 
them in considerably more general terms.  
The new Act gave copyright owners five “fundamental rights” to be offset against 
subsequent exceptions.76  
The approach of  the bill is to set forth the copyright owner’s exclusive rights 
in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations, 
qualifications, or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything 
in section 106 is made “subject to sections 107 through 118,” and must be 
read in conjunction with those provisions.77
The contrast in drafting styles between the two Acts is significant. The 1909 Act 
granted rights that were static in nature and had to be constantly retrofitted by Congress.78  
Public choice theory predicts that legislative outcomes will be the product of  interest 
group competition in a political market place.79 In that political marketplace, small groups 
with concentrated interests will mobilize more effectively than large groups with diffuse 
interests. The application of  public choice theory to the 1976 Act is fairly obvious: well 
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74. 17 USC 302. Extended to the life of  the author plus 70 years and 95 years 
respectively by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of  1998.  
75. According to Lessig, renewal rates were so low in 1973 that the average term of  
copyright protection in was only 32.2 years. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 2, at 135.  
76. The exclusive rights of  reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and 
display. See House Report No. 94-1476; 17 USC 106 (1) through (5). In 1995 Congress added the 
digital audio transmission right specifically reserved for sound recordings, 17 USC 106(6), Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of  1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). 
77. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 ([date]).  
78. The 1976 gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to: “(1) reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; [and] (2) prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.” In contrast to this general and technologically neutral language, the comparable 
section of  the 1909 Act vests the following exclusive rights in copyright owners: “(a) To print, 
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work; (b) To translate the copyrighted work into 
other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if  it be a literary work; to dramatize it 
if  it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if  it be a drama; to 
arrange or adapt it if  it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if  it be a model or 
design for a work of  art.” 
79. See generally, Mancur Olson, The Logic Of  Collective Action: Public Goods 
And The Theory Of  Groups (1971). 
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represented copyright holders, such as the media, received a significant increase in both the 
scope and duration of  protection; well represented copyright users such as libraries received 
special treatment by way of  exemptions; the unrepresented public discovered that their 
residual freedoms, and the public domain, had decreased accordingly.80
In her book, Digital Copyright, Jessica Litman provides a compelling and detailed 
account of  the decades of  protracted negotiation that that led to the passage of  the 1976 
Act.81 Two related features stand out in this account: (1) revising the Copyright Act has 
proved difficult and time consuming; (2) special interest group representatives have had an 
unusually direct influence in drafting the new Copyright Act. 
The first major revision of  the Copyright Act in the 20th century was completed in 
1909; it took until 1976 to achieve another one. The intervening period witnessed the 
Depression, two world wars, and the invention of  a variety of  devices that would come to 
transform copyright, including: talking motion pictures, the radio tuner, television, the 
jukebox, the photocopier, the computer, videotape recorders and musical synthesizers. 
During this period, there were almost continual but unsuccessful efforts by both Congress 
and various interest groups to revise the 1909 Act in light of  these developments.  
Litman offers a standard public choice explanation for the revised structure of  the 
Copyright Act that was eventually passed in 1976: conflicts between represented interests 
were solved by increasing the surplus to be divided (by expanding copyright) at the expense 
of  the greater public.82 The public choice account is convincing in its own terms, but it 
overlooks the considerable merit of  adopting a dynamic copyright structure. To understand 
why this is so, and the significance for fair use, it is helpful to consider some of  the literature 
on the choice between rules and standards. 
In an ideal world, copyright law would accommodate at least three different 
constraints: incentive optimization, administrative efficiency and adaptability. First, the law 
would create sufficient incentives to encourage and sustain the production of  society’s 
optimal level and quality of  intellectual and creative output. Second, the rights established by 
that law would be sufficiently certain to allow them to be observed and enforced with 
minimal administrative and transaction costs. Finally, the law would adapt to social and 
technological change, so that it continued to comply with the optimization and 
administrative efficiency criteria.  
Obviously no such law exists. In fact, there is an inherent tension between the 
administrative efficiency criteria and adaptability criteria. In theory, laws that are more 
specific have a lower cost of  administration, but that same specificity makes them more 
likely to produce undesirable or paradoxical results in response to unforeseen situations. In 
other words, specific laws are prone to obsolescence. At least three considerations govern 
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80. Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71. Peter Drahos tells the same story on a 
global scale concerning the 1994 Uruguay Round of  trade negotiations and the adoption of  the 
TRIPS agreement. See Peter Drahos, Information Feudalism: Who Owns The Knowledge 
Economy? (2001).  
81. Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71. 
82. Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71.  
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the legislative choice to make laws more or less specific. First, although rules are associated 
with lower compliance costs, they are typically harder to write in the first place. In contrast, a 
legislative standard is easier to write but shifts costs from the law making body to those who 
must comply with the law because of  both information costs and uncertainty.83  
The second consideration in choosing between rules and standards is determining 
how the law should change in response to new circumstances. Laws which are dramatically 
affected by social and technological change must be regularly adapted to new circumstances. 
Received wisdom tells us that standards are easier to keep up-to-date than rules.84 Standards 
do not require continual legislative intervention to adapt to changing circumstances because 
they are only given content through their application to particular situations. Accordingly, in 
spite of  their increased compliance costs, standards may be preferable where the 
opportunities for legislative resolution are limited; this observation leads directly to the third 
consideration, public choice theory.  
As noted above, public choice theory holds that interest group competition affects 
legislative outcomes. An important extension of  simple public choice theory also suggests 
that interest group competition in a multiple veto-point political system affects legislative 
style as well as policy direction.85 The active involvement of  a number of  interest groups 
with non-aligned or only partially aligned interests makes finding a specific compromise on 
any particular issue difficult. The more interest groups, the more difficult that prospect will 
be. In the U.S., building consensus is even more difficult because the complexity of  the 
legislative process results in multiple veto points.86 The passage of  legislation requires a 
majority in the relevant committees, the House, the Senate and Presidential approval. The 
more specific a bill is, the more difficult it is likely to be to secure all the required majorities.  
Obstacles to more specific legislation may have a compounding effect in an 
environment that is known to be prone to external shocks. The parties involved should 
anticipate that if  legislation was difficult to pass initially, it will also be difficult to amend in 
response to unforeseen circumstances. A risk averse interest group might prefer incomplete 
legislation which transfers the forum of  conflict from a one-shot legislative solution to an 
ongoing judicial process. Consistent with this theory, Attiyah and Summers have commented 
that Congress adopts incomplete policy instruments and relies on case law to determine the 
content of  the law more than other comparable nations.87  
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83. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 
(1992). 
84. Id. at 617. 
85. Tonja Jacobi, Explaining American Litigiousness, A Product Of  Politics, Not Just 
Law (2004) (working paper, on file with author). 
86. Id.
87. P.S. Attiyah & R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law 
(1987), from 298. 
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Incomplete legislation does not lead to anarchy: where Congress fails to act, courts 
fill the void, completing incomplete policies in a process that is only nominally interpretive.88 
In spite of  frequent references to ‘activist judges’ in political rhetoric, judicial policy making 
may arise as much from legislative abdication as from judicial usurpation. Indeed, there is a 
view that Congress routinely passes the task of  resolving unpleasant political issues to the 
courts.89 For example, Congress could have resolved the issue of  home video taping through 
legislative action before the Supreme Court was forced reach the issue in Sony, but the 
“chance to do nothing and blame it on another branch of  government was predictably hard 
for Congress to resist.”90  
In sum, where Congress knows that a specific policy provision would be initially 
difficult to draft, would be rapidly made obsolete by external changes, and would be difficult 
to rewrite in response to those changes, it may rationally (or expediently) choose to enact an 
incomplete policy, leaving it to the courts to add content to that standard by applying it to 
particular situations as they arise. Congress’ broad definition of  the rights of  copyright 
owners and its incomplete codification of  the fair use doctrine both fit neatly with this 
description. 
Congress’ intention in recasting the exclusive rights in such broad language in the 
1976 Act was to change the way copyright law dealt with new technology. Previously, courts 
had typically resisted extending copyright protection to new technologies without explicit 
legislative guidance.91 The adoption of  broadly stated exclusive rights in the new Act was 
intended to “change the old pattern and enact a statute that would cover new technologies, 
as well as old.”92  
The legislative history shows that Congress was aware of  the extent to which the 
existing balance of  copyright protection had been disrupted by past technologies, such as the 
player piano and the photocopier.93 The congressional record also indicates that Congress 
realized that it was not in a position to anticipate the implications of  social and technological 
changes yet to occur.94 Just as Congress was aware of  the difficulty, ex ante, of  specifying the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
88. Id. at 308; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 
19 (1985).  
89. See, e.g., Frank J. Macchiarola, The Courts in the Political Process: Judicial Activism 
or Timid Local Government? 9 St. John’s J. L. Comm. 703, 704 (1994). 
90. Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway, From Gutenberg to the Celestial 
Jukebox 121 (rev’d ed. 2003). 
91. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 
74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
92. Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457–458 (1984). 
93. The revision effort leading up to the 1976 Act was “[s]purred by the recognition 
that significant developments in technology and communications had rendered the 1909 Act 
inadequate.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 463 (1984). S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975). 
94. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476; S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975) 
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application of  copyright to technological developments, it was also aware of  the 
unlikelihood that it would be able to respond ex post in a manner that was either timely or 
effective.95 In short, Congress appears to have understood that any new copyright law would 
have to be broadly expressed to allow it to respond dynamically to unforeseen events 
because the politics of  copyright reform were such that its own ability to respond would be 
limited. The shift to a dynamic copyright regime, implemented in the 1976 Act, may have 
been the product of  special interest politics, but it was also sound public policy in light of  
copyright’s susceptibility to technological change.  
One of  the first technologies to put the 1976 Act to the test was the VCR. In 1984, 
the Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of  the VCR, Sony, was not liable for selling a 
machine that could lead to widespread reproduction of  copyrighted materials.96 This ruling 
indicated to some that the courts would be unable or unwilling to adapt copyright to 
embrace new technology as Congress intended. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s dissent criticized 
the majority on just that basis.  
It is no answer, of  course, to refer to and stress, … this Court’s “consistent 
deference to Congress” whenever “major technological innovations” appear. 
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the Court has tended 
to evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of  copyright law. I see no 
reason for the Court to be particularly pleased with this tradition or to 
continue it. Indeed, it is fairly clear from the legislative history of  the 1976 
Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and enact a statute that 
would cover new technologies, as well as old.97
The majority stressed the importance of  allowing Congress to determine the 
appropriate response to new technology throughout its decision. 
As the text of  the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been 
assigned the task of  defining the scope of  the limited monopoly that should 
be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate 
access to their work product. 
. . .  
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected 
representatives of  the millions of  people who watch television every day 
have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have 
enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of  machines that make such 
copying possible.98
                                                                                                                                                                             
95. Id.  
96. Sony, 464 U.S. at (1984). 
97. Id. at 457–458. 
98. Id. at 429, 456; see also id. at 431 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our 
consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for 
copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to 
accommodate fully the varied permutations of  competing interests that are inevitably implicated by 
such new technology.”) 
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However, the rhetoric of  deference employed by the majority must be carefully 
assessed in light of  its actual ruling. The majority did not find the Copyright Act inapplicable 
to the video cassette recorders; nor did it hold that new technology always required new 
legislation. What it did say was that under the current law, although other forms of  
reproduction using a VCR may have been infringing, non-commercial time-shifting 
constituted a fair use of  the new technology. The majority did apply the new Act to the VCR 
as Congress intended.  Whether that application was the same as the one Congress might 
have made is another question altogether.  
Part III—Fair Use in the Context of 
an Evolving Copyright System  
One of  the criticisms of  the new copyright regime implemented in 1976 is that the 
interaction of  broadly expressed exclusive rights with narrowly crafted exceptions has a 
ratcheting effect on copyright protection. The rights of  copyright owners adapt to 
technological challenges, whereas users’ rights are diminished or marginalized. This concern 
is particularly pronounced with respect to the possible effects of  restrictive licensing and 
technological measures, such as digital rights management. The expectation that fair use 
should preserve the balance of  copyright assumes there is one unique and identifiable 
balance to be preserved, it also assumes that the past is a better reflection of  that balance 
than the present. If  the function of  fair use was to preserve users’ rights, or maintain the 
status quo, it would appear to be failing dismally.  
On the other hand, if  the success of  fair use is measured by the extent to which has 
enabled copyright law to smoothly adapt to new challenges, fair use is doing pretty well. 
Understanding fair use from a structural perspective tells us something more about fair use 
than is revealed by the observation of  individual cases. The structure of  the Copyright Act 
and the history of  copyright law indicate that the true function of  fair use is to enable 
copyright law to evolve in response to new challenges without necessitating legislative 
intervention. As this section elaborates, fair use is fundamentally different from the majority 
of  other exceptions that limit the rights of  copyright owners because it is both dynamic 
(unlike most exceptions) and contextual (unlike the idea expression distinction). Significantly, 
like the idea expression distinction, fair use is also a constitutionally required feature of  
copyright law. All of  this makes fair use very significant. In addition, a structural analysis of  
fair use indicates that the doctrine is meant to be used as a flexible standard through which 
the judiciary can determine the application of  copyright in response to social and 
technological changes – fair use was never intended to preserve the status quo in the face of  
change.  
A. The Nature of  Fair Use 
Unlike the most other exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, fair use is 
a dynamic standard. As a statement of  legislative policy, the fair use doctrine is undeniably 
vague. Section 107 of  the Copyright Act states that “the fair use of  a copyrighted work is 
not an infringement of  copyright.”99 Section 107 also provides a non-exclusive list of  six 
examples of  fair use (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research) and four non-exclusive factors for courts 
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to consider in applying the doctrine.100 The vagueness of  the fair use provision stands in 
marked contrast to the specificity of  many other sections of  the Act, and it begs the 
question of  why Congress adopted rules in some places and standards in others.  
The narrowness of  the static exemptions is easily illustrated. The Act creates a 
statutory exemption allowing libraries to copy an existing published work to a new format if  
the existing format has become obsolete.101 There is no privilege to upgrade to a format that 
is merely superior or more convenient, and persons other than libraries have no such express 
right at all. Many other exemptions follow a similar pattern, applying only to a particular 
special interest and only with respect to a limited class of  conduct.  
The Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) of  1992 demonstrates the limitations of  
the Act’s many static exemptions. The AHRA reflects a deal between music industry 
interests and device manufacturers. Under that deal, device manufactures agreed to pay 
royalties for, and include technological limitations in, digital audio recording devices.102 In 
return for these royalties and technological restrictions, music industry interests consented to 
a provision in the Copyright Act which immunizes noncommercial copying using a digital 
audio recording device or a digital audio recording medium.103  
The AHRA was a static and narrow solution to a particular problem: Congress could 
have legislated as to the legality of  consumer home audio copying more generally, but failed 
to do so. The AHRA has no application to a consumer who converts CDs to MP3 files, nor 
do the royalty provisions apply to MP3 players.104 Consequently, the AHRA amendments to 
the Copyright Act have been entirely inconsequential in the public furor that has surrounded 
MP3s, file-sharing and webcasting in the past few years. As the AHRA illustrates, in a fast-
changing environment, even detailed rules that perfectly address a group’s concerns tend to 
ultimately fail in that aim. 
Unlike the idea expression distinction, fair use contextual. This difference has 
important implications. The idea expression distinction is dynamic and universal in its 
application. The idea expression distinction, which holds that “no author may copyright his 
ideas or the facts he narrates,”105 is one of  the fundamental axioms of  copyright law. 
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information contained in an 
author’s work, it merely protects the expression of  those ideas and information.106 The idea 
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100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ([date]). 
101. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c) ([date]). 
102. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 132.  
103. The provision does not make this conduct non-infringing per se, rather it cannot 
form the basis of  an action for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 ([date]). 
104. Recording Indus. Ass’n of  Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
105. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) ([date]).  
106. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–219 (2003). 
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expression distinction is not an exemption from copyright, it is statement of  one of  its 
inherent limitations in scope.107
The idea expression distinction is very important but it is not the appropriate vehicle 
to resolve every tension in copyright, because it does not contextualize. For example, the 
idea expression distinction does not provide a means to distinguish between the partial 
copying of  a work for an academic or critical purpose and the same conduct for some less-
favored purpose. Nor can it be used to take account of  the difference between private use 
and non-private use. The idea expression distinction focuses solely on the alleged copying in 
question; it does not take into account the circumstances, effects and motivations 
surrounding that copying.108 Thus the idea expression distinction protects a computer 
programmer who copies an application protocol interface (“API”) to enable her program to 
interface with the original, but it does not protect the copying of  the entire program that was 
part of  the reverse engineering process that uncovered the API in the first place.109 However, 
reverse engineering is protected by fair use.110  
The difference between the idea expression distinction and fair use is particularly 
important to understand because the two are so often confused.111 An example of  the 
confusion between the idea expression distinction and fair use is the mode of  criticism 
directed at a series of  admittedly problematic cases. In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol 
Publishing Group, Inc., a district court held that The Joy of  Trek, a guidebook for the Star 
Trek uninitiated, infringed the copyright in the original series.112 In Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the Second Circuit held that The 
Seinfeld Aptitude Test, literally a sequence of  hundreds of  trivia questions and answers 
relating to the Seinfeld series, also infringed the copyright in the original series.113 In each 
                                                                                                                                                                             
107. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ([date]). Section 102 of  the Copyright Act sets out the subject 
matter of  copyright and also states that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of  
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of  operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery, regardless of  the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”  Id. 
108. This follows under either the ordinary observer test, or a more structured inquiry. 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (observer test for substantial 
similarity); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (abstraction, filtration 
comparison test for substantial similarity). 
109. See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  
110. Id. at 608 (Defendant’s intermediate copying during the course of  its reverse 
engineering held a fair use as a matter of  law.)
111. 4–13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 (defense of  fair use often invoked without 
reference to the particular use employed by the defendant, and merely as an alternative label for 
similarity that is not infringing because it is not substantial). 
112. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).  
113. Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 
(2d Cir. 1998). 
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case the amount of  expression from any individual broadcast or the series in total was slight 
and fragmentary, but remarkably the courts had little trouble characterizing the guide book 
and the aptitude test as substantially similar to the plaintiff ’s copyrighted work. A number of  
scholars, such as Matthew Bunker,114 have characterized these decisions as misapplications of  
the fair use doctrine. These decisions are extraordinary, but not primarily by virtue of  their 
failure to find fair use.  
In these cases, courts appear to have mischaracterized as derivative works those that 
simply reference but do not reproduce the plaintiffs’ copyrighted material. If  we suspend 
disbelief  and assume that, the work of  the defendants in these cases was indeed substantially 
similar to that of  the plaintiffs, and that the extent of  that similarity was significantly more 
than was required for their analysis or criticism of  the original, then the courts were correct 
to find in favor of  the plaintiffs. The courts in Paramount and Castle Rock appear to have 
confused potential profit for protectable interest. The mere fact that the defendant was 
attempting to profit by catering to the significant public interest in Seinfeld and Star Trek 
does not establish any protectable similarity between books discussing the television 
programs and the programs themselves.  
Fair use has a significant structural role in copyright, relying on fair use to make up 
for erroneous decisions on whether there was presumptively actionable copying in the first 
place can only further distort and confuse fair use analysis. Fair use is structurally unique 
among all the limitations and exception to copyright rights, because it is both dynamic and 
contextual. The structural role of  fair use does not include playing catcher every time a judge 
misses the ball.  
B. The Roles of  Fair Use 
Given the 1976 Act’s grant of  expansive and pervasive copyright rights, fair use has a 
role to play in maintaining a constitutionally acceptable balance between copyright and 
freedom of  speech. This role warrants brief  description but is well understood. What is less 
recognized but equally important is fair use’s structural role within copyright. The First 
Amendment provides that in part that Congress “shall make no law… abridging the freedom 
of  speech.”115 As a consequence, government restrictions on speech, such as laws against 
flag burning,116 and private law actions that effect speech, such as libel,117 are greatly 
restricted by the First Amendment. Copyright is a federal law that restricts speech by 
creating an exclusive property right in original expression contained in a tangible medium, 
albeit for a limited time. The possibility that copyright has a harmful effect on freedom of  
speech has increased because of  the expansion of  copyright ownership as discussed in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
114. Matthew Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine After 
Campbell, 7 Comm. L. & Pol’y 1, 10–16 (2002). Bunker also criticizes the Ninth Circuit’s Dr. Seuss 
opinion on the same grounds. Id. But that case may have been soundly decided based on the 
similarities between the defendant’s back cover illustration and the plaintiff ’s book, as opposed to 
“similarities in typeface, poetic meter, whimsical style or visual style.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997). 
115. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
116. Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).  
117. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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previous section. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held that copyright does 
not present a danger to freedom of  speech because of  the idea expression distinction and 
the fair use doctrine, copyright’s “own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.”118  
Fair use serves an important constitutional role in maintaining a balance between 
establishing incentives for the creation of  works and guaranteeing sufficient access to those 
works to preserve a constitutionally acceptable level of  freedom of  speech. However, as 
Rebecca Tushnet observes, it would be a mistake to simply equate the scope of  fair use with 
the scope of  freedom of  speech required by the constitution—the two concepts are 
interrelated but they are not coterminous.119 More is required of  fair use than simply 
satisfying the requirements of  the First Amendment.  
Fair use turns out to be the final arbiter of  the rights of  the copyright owner in a 
broad range of  situations. Current and recently decided fair use cases have asked courts in 
various jurisdictions to determine whether and to what extent: 
• a defendant was entitled to base a test preparation on a copyrighted reference 
book;120  
• a large computer hardware manufacturer was entitled to copy illustrations and 
phrases from a guide to computer injury prevention for use in its own from 
safety guide;121  
• a city police department was entitled to display a criminal defendant’s 
photographs in the course of  its investigation;122  
• a hip-hop magazine was entitled to copy and distribute the early unpublished 
works of  a prominent recording artist to expose his alleged racism;123  
• a public interest group was entitled to publish a private company’s internal emails 
relating to its electronic voting machines, to inform the public about alleged 
problems associated with those electronic voting machines;124 and  
• a defendant was entitled to publish a book containing its own photographs of  
the plaintiff ’s copyrighted Beanie Babies.125
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118. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–219 (2003); see also Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556–558 (1985). 
119. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004). Tushnet argues that fair use alone may not be 
enough to clear copyright of  all First Amendment concerns. 
120. Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004). 
121. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004). 
122. Shell v. City of  Radford, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
123. Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
124. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
125. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 333 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  
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It seems unlikely that any consistent theme will emerge from the ultimate disposition 
or settlement of  these cases. Nonetheless, these cases are conceptually linked. In each case 
the broad statement of  the rights of  the copyright owner set out in the Copyright Act is 
incomplete—it does not by itself  determine the ability of  the copyright owner to control the 
use of  his or her work.  
While others have suggested that fair use should be seen as more than “a grudgingly 
tolerated exception to the copyright owner’s rights of  private property,”126 typically these 
explanations stop short with the observation that the exclusive rights can not be absolute.127 
Once that point is conceded, it still remains to be answered why fair use is necessary in 
addition to the specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses and the idea expression 
distinction.  
Indeed, fair use is not a necessary or inevitable feature of  copyright law in the 
abstract—it is nonetheless a fundamental principle of  the our copyright law today. In theory, 
the role played by fair use in limiting the rights of  copyright owners could be performed by 
specific statutory exemptions, compulsory licenses, or a more concrete statement of  rights in 
the first place. Alternatively or in addition, we could rely on high enforcement costs, private 
ordering solutions and norms of  forbearance and reciprocity to moderate any adverse 
effects of  overbroad copyright protection.  
In spite of  the theoretical possibility of  copyright without fair use, copyright law has 
in fact developed a fundamental role for the doctrine. From its inception, the fair use 
doctrine has facilitated the expansion of  copyright by providing a flexible limiting principle 
that defines the outer limits of  the copyright owners’ rights.128 As discussed in the previous 
section, in 1976 Congress again significantly expanded the rights of  copyright owners by 
rephrasing their exclusive rights in broad technologically neutral terms. At the same time, 
Congress transferred significant policy making responsibility to the courts by incorporating 
fair use as a flexible standard in the 1976 Act. It is not a coincidence that Congress chose to 
codify fair use as a standard at the same time that it radically expanded copyright rights in the 
1976 Act.  
On an operational level, findings of  fair use establish both limits on the rights of  
copyright owners and affirmative rights in the hands of  users. However, it would be a 
mistake to view the function of  fair use as restraining copyright owners or empowering users 
for its own sake. Structurally, fair use transfers significant policy making responsibility to the 
judiciary, allowing judges to develop the law in response to external changes. This structural 
role of  fair use is significant because of  the perceived inability of  the legislative process to 
keep pace with the demands of  rapid technological and social changes. A flexible, forward-
looking set of  owner’s rights, combined with a flexible fair use doctrine, allows Congress to 
legislate less frequently and entrust significant policy responsibility to the judiciary. 
Judicial policy making may trouble those bound up in literalist theories of  
democracy, but it is not without precedent. Courts exert a significant policy making role in 
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127. Id. at 1136. 
128. Sub-section C.1. explains the origins of  fair use in more detail.  
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other areas, such as antitrust law. The fair use doctrine requires courts to determine the limits 
of  the copyright monopoly and adapt copyright law in response to both incremental changes 
and external shocks.129 The role of  fair use is especially significant given the impact of  new 
technology on copyright.130  
This is not meant to convey the impression that Congress has somehow limited its 
capacity to provide legislative solutions to the questions raised by new technology. On the 
contrary, Congress can and should continue to play an active role in the development of  
copyright law.131 What it does mean is that Congress does not need to rush to legislative 
solutions, and that it need not fear that its inaction will bring the system to a grinding halt.  
There are two aspects to the structural role of  fair use. First, fair use provides the 
flexible and dynamic boundary on copyright rights that makes their expansive and flexible 
definition feasible. Second, a flexible and dynamic copyright system necessitates giving 
judges significant policy making power over both the application of  copyright rights and the 
fair use doctrine. Congress could have relied on specific codified exceptions to the exclusive 
rights instead of  a dynamic fair use standard. However, specific exceptions face the same 
problems as specific owner’s rights – they require constant revision in the face of  social and 
technological changes affecting copyright. The rationale for broad and dynamic exclusive 
rights is equally applicable fair use, flexibility requires delegation. Realistically, Congress is 
institutionally incapable of  legislating on copyright with the frequency that would be 
demanded under a system with more specific rights and exemptions due to the daily changes 
in the environment in which those rights are exercised.  
Structurally, fair use is both a point of  flexibility within copyright and a mechanism 
of  delegation. Copyright protection has lengthened, broadened and deepened as a result of  
the 1976 Act; fair use cannot be expected to counteract these reforms, its role is to adapt the 
law Congress has made to society’s changing needs.  
C. The Effect of  the Structural Role of  Fair 
Use on Copyright Owners 
Fair use has been characterized as a “tax” on copyright owners, a “subsidy” in favor 
of  particular groups,132 and a fundamental right of  the public in relation to copyrighted 
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129. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). (“The fair use doctrine 
thus permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of  the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
130. In the words of  the House Report, “there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the 
statute, especially during a period of  rapid technological change...[T]he courts must be free to adapt 
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476; S. Rep. No. 94-
473 (1975) at 66. 
131. Indeed, Congress has enacted detailed rules regarding the copyright liability of  internet 
service providers, the circumvention of  encryption and related matters in the Digital Millenium 
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).   
132. Robert P. Merges, The End of  Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
“Newtonian” World of  On-Line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115 (1997); see Cohen, supra 
note 64, at footnote 5 for other similar references. 
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works.133 All of  these characterizations miss the mark because of  their focus on the case-by-
case operation of  the fair use doctrine, as opposed to its overall structural function.  
Fair use is more than sum total of  winners and losers of  particular cases; from a 
structural perspective, fair use provides a point of  flexibility in copyright law that facilitates 
adjustment to unforeseen changes. One implication of  fair use’s structural role is that that it 
advantages copyright owners as a class. The claim that fair use systemically advantages 
copyright owners is not susceptible to empirical proof: it relies on comparison with a non-
existent world in there was no fair use doctrine as we know it today. In order to make the 
case that fair use advantages copyright owners, I examine the origins of  the doctrine in the 
19th century and the application of  fair use today in the debate over private sphere uses of  
copyrighted works.  
1. The Origins of Fair Use  
The fair use doctrine emerged as part of  copyright’s shift in focus in the 19th century 
from an economic privilege of  the printing industry to a system of  rights centered around 
an abstract notion of  authorship.134 In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, copyright in both 
England and the U.S. was confined to “the sole right and liberty of  printing, reprinting, 
publishing and vending” protected works such as books, maps and charts.135 In spite of  the 
nominal switch from printer’s monopoly to author’s right achieved by the Statute of  Anne in 
1710, copyright remained firmly rooted in the practices and technology of  printing until the 
mid-1800s.136 In the early 1800s, copyright infringement was limited to verbatim 
reproduction, or replication with only colorable changes made merely to evade the copyright 
owner’s rights.137  
In 1839 in Gray v. Russell, Justice Story signaled his view that copyright infringement 
should extend well beyond verbatim and evasive reproduction, in order to protect the 
“quintessence” of  the work and its economic value, not just the owner’s interest in 
printing.138 Justice Story began this expansion in Gray v. Russell by qualifying the previously 
                                                                                                                                                                             
133. DanThu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use Function On The Internet?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 
169, 212 (1998). 
134. Bracha, supra note 69. 
135. U.S. Copyright Act 1790, Section 1. (Protected matter itself  limited to maps, charts 
and books). English law was similar at the time. Loren, supra note 66, 13. 
136. The simplicity of  this general characterization is not intended to deny the existence 
of  a more complex historical process or suggest that this transformation was entirely even. For a 
more detailed account, see Bracha, supra note 69. 
137. See Loren, supra note 66, 13–15; Bracha, supra note 69, at 36; Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 
Atk. 141 143, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.1740). In Cary v. Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough declared, 
“[the presence of] part of  the work of  one author is found in another, is not of  itself  piracy, or 
sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly adopt part of  the work of  another: he may so make 
use of  another’s labors for the promotion of  science, and the benefit of  the public.” Cary v. Kearsley 
4 Esp. 168, 170 (1802) (spelling modernized). 
138. Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839). 
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understood position that an abridgment of  an existing work did not constitute infringement, 
a proposition that in Justice Story’s words “must be received with many qualifications.”139  
Two years later in the case of  Folsom v. Marsh,140 Justice Story was able to further 
articulate the substance of  those qualifications, giving rise to what would become known as 
the fair use doctrine. Justice Story ruled that to determine whether a selection from a 
copyrighted work constituted copyright infringement courts must: “look to the nature and 
objects of  the selections made, the quantity and value of  the materials used, and the degree 
in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of  
the original work.”141
This formulation not only encapsulated the fair use doctrine prior to its codification 
in the 1976 Copyright Act, but the influence of  Justice Story’s summary also remains 
discernible in the statute’s four factors which dominate judicial analysis of  fair use today.142
Both Gray and Folsom cast the rights of  the copyright owner in terms of  the market 
value of  the work in question, as opposed to narrow rights of  literal or evasive reproduction. 
The centrality of  market value in Justice Story’s abstraction of  the protected work is 
manifest. In Gray v. Russell he explained the need to protect the work, both from extracts 
that sought to “supersede the original work under the pretence of  a review,” and 
abridgments which “by the omission of  some unimportant parts… prejudice or supersede 
the original work” or compete with the original in “the same class of  readers.”143 These 
points were reiterated in Folsom v. Marsh: 
It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of  parts of  the 
original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held 
to be such an abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of  
the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not 
merely the facile use of  the scissors; or extracts of  the essential parts, 
constituting the chief  value of  the original work.144
Fair use was not only coincident with this significant expansion in the rights of  
copyright owners, it was the fundamental doctrinal tool facilitating that expansion. During 
the 19th century, copyright began to outgrow literalism and refocused around a broader and 
more conceptually challenging notion of  the work as an abstract object with economic value. 
Before fair use, copyright owners’ rights were narrowly defined and the public at large 
retained a broad freedom to, among other things, extract and abridge existing works. Fair use 
enabled a significant expansion of  owners’ rights by establishing a limiting principle that 
subordinated the public’s interest in the use of  copyrighted works to the owner’s economic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
139. Id.
140. 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
141. Id. at 348. 
142. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). 
143. Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1038. [?] 
144. Folsom v Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (citations 
omitted). 
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interests; an irony that is often lost on modern observers.145 Fair use is seen as a limitation on 
the rights of  copyright owners, but it actually serves a structurally expansive role in relation 
to those rights.  
2. Fair Use and Private Sphere Activity 
Operationally, fair use may appear to benefit members of  the public by limiting the 
rights of  copyright owners; nonetheless, structurally, fair use advantages copyright owners as 
a class by allowing their rights to be more expansively defined a priori. This tension between 
the structural and operational aspects of  the fair use doctrine continues into the present day. 
The structural role of  fair use in this regard can be seen most readily in relation to the 
regulation of  the use of  copyrighted material in the private sphere. In the domestic context, 
fair use has been effectively used by the courts to develop copyright law with more subtlety 
than Congress could have conceivably achieved legislating before the fact, and possibly even 
after. This illustrates the interrelationship between fair use’s two structural roles. First, fair 
use is the flexible counter-weight that enables flexible copyright rights. Second, that 
flexibility is achieved by congressional delegation of  substantial policy-making responsibility 
to the judiciary. The flexible design of  both the exclusive rights and of  fair use require 
judges to adapt copyright to changing circumstances rather than waiting for congressional 
guidance which may never arrive.  
The extent to which copyright owners can regulate the use of  copyrighted material in 
the private sphere is one of  the most compelling and enduring issues in modern copyright 
law. Traditionally, copyright owners have exercised very limited rights with respect to use of  
their works in the home for a number of  reasons: lack of  commercial significance of  those 
uses, uncertainty as to the application of  the rights, and practical difficulties in enforcement. 
According to Litman, the scope of  allowable copying in the private sphere received little 
explicit attention in the revision process for the 1976 Act.146 Congress’ failure to say anything 
on the legality of  private copying has been roundly criticized, but unfairly so.147 
Congressional silence on the issue has in fact allowed the law relating to private copying to 
develop in a more nuanced fashion than would have been possible if  Congress had acted 
more decisively.  
Presumably, when the last major revision to Copyright Act was finally passed in 
1976, Congress would have been aware that issues would arise in relation to the private use 
of  copyrighted material.148 Given that awareness, Congress was faced with several choices: 
(1) make private use expressly immune from copyright; (2) make private use expressly subject 
                                                                                                                                                                             
145. Bracha, supra note 69. 
146. Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 71, at 52.  
147. Litman criticizes the omission because it has allowed regulation of  private copying. 
Id. Goldstein takes the opposite view and comments that “[t]he silence of  Congress on the issue of  
private copies has left a black hole in the centre of  American copyright legislation.” Goldstein, supra 
note 90, at 107.  
148. See, e.g., the exchange between Representative Beister and the Assistant Register of  
Copyrights in relation to off-the-air recording by consumers. June, 1971, Subcommittee No. 3 of  the 
House Committee on the Judiciary; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of  America, 480 F. 
Supp. 429, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1979) 
U of M Law School Publications Center, April 28, 2005, 1:49 PM 
Page 29 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
MTTLR 11-2 Edit Format Document GITM MTTLR Version 
 
to copyright; (3) try to specify which private uses were immune to copyright, leaving the 
remainder subject to copyright; (4) conversely, try to specify which private uses were subject 
to copyright, leaving the remainder immune to copyright; or (5) do nothing and leave it to 
the courts to determine. As discussed in Part I, in drafting the 1976 Act, Congress was 
unusually sensitized to its own inability to predict the how technological change would effect 
the balance between copyright owners and the public. As part of  the dynamic structure 
adopted in 1976, Congress opted by omission to leave questions relating to the private use 
of  copyrighted material to the courts to resolve by applying the fair use doctrine. Doing so 
was the only practical solution given Congress’ preference for expansive and dynamic 
exclusive rights. 
If  Congress had taken option 1 in 1976 and exempted private copying of  
copyrighted works from copyright liability, it would have done so in total ignorance of  the 
potential effects of  this choice. In 1976, Congress could not have realized the potential of  
personal computers and other devices linked via non-commercial peer-to-peer networks to 
displace commercial distribution of  music, film, television, video games, and books.149 It is 
now apparent that unauthorized peer-to-peer file-sharing of  copyrighted works is unlawful, 
regardless of  whether it is non-commercial or takes place purely within the privacy of  
private homes or college dormitories. Unlike unauthorized home video recording for the 
purpose of  time-shifting, unauthorized file-sharing is not fair use.150 The Supreme Court is 
currently considering under what circumstances the distributors of  peer-to-peer file-sharing 
software may be held liable for uses of  their software that infringe third party copyrights.151 
Some commentators argue that unauthorized file-sharing should be treated as fair use, or 
else covered by some form of  compulsory license.152 Interestingly, Justice Stevens’ first draft 
of  the Sony decision took the view that the exclusive rights of  copyright owners had no 
application in the private sphere as a matter of  statutory interpretation.153 However, since 
Sony, drawing any kind of  bright-line distinction between public and private has become 
increasingly problematic because of  the increased capacity of  private individuals to rip, mix, 
burn and most importantly, file-share.  
On the other hand, if  Congress had adopted option 2 and made no allowance for 
the private use of  copyrighted material, the resulting law would have been both 
extraordinarily oppressive and unpopular. First, Congress probably could not have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
149. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 106.  
150. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (direct 
infringement by users of  P2P file-sharing service undisputed); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (unauthorized P2P file-sharing not fair use). 
151. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.[cite to US] 686 (2004) (certiorari 
granted). 
152. William W. Fisher III, Promises To Keep: Technology, Law, And The Future 
Of  Entertainment (2004) (compulsory license); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial 
Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2003) (same); Raymond 
S. Ku, The Creative Destruction of  Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of  Digital 
Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (2002) (fair use).  
153. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 122.  
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anticipated that the exclusive reproduction right it bestowed on copyright owners would be 
effectively transformed into an exclusive use right in the digital context. Consider that the 
user of  a book simply picks it up and begins to read; whereas, the equivalent activity in a 
digital medium requires first making a copy in random access memory of  a computer.154 It is 
seems unlikely that the public could be expected to tolerate this radical expansion of  
copyright without some assurance that their rights to use copyrighted material in the ways 
they had always used it would not be too greatly effected. Fair use provides that assurance, 
albeit somewhat uncertainly at the margins.  
Second, on their face, the exclusive rights of  the copyright owner are infringed by 
any number of  seemingly harmless private activities. Examples include: time-shifting 
broadcast television (copying); converting music on CD into a format compatible with a 
portable device (also copying);155 and singing “Happy Birthday To You” at a restaurant open 
to the public (public performance).156 That these examples do not constitute copyright 
infringement illustrates a more general principle: the exclusive rights of  copyright owners are 
not absolute, their application varies according to the context.157
The blanket solutions of  option 1 and option 2 are infeasible; what of  options 3 and 
4? To some extent, Congress has pursued option 3 in an attempt to strike a balance between 
the interests of  owners and the public in relation to private use of  copyrighted material, by 
specifying some activities as non-infringing.158 However, these specific exemptions represent 
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154. See, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) see 
also, 2–8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08.  
155. There is considerable debate over whether time shifting and format shifting are in 
fact harmless, but it is safe to say most people think they are. See Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, 
Music Downloading, File-sharing and Copyright: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo, July 2003, 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf (finding that 67% 
of  Internet users who download music don’t care whether the music they download is copyrighted). 
Even the Recording Industry Association of  America acknowledges that consumers are entitled to 
make copies of  their own CDs for personal use on computers and portable music players. 
Presumably, the fair use doctrine is the source of  that entitlement. See the RIAA website at 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/ask/default.asp#stand (last visited May 11, 2004) (on file with author).  
156. The Copyright Act only gives copyright owners an exclusive right to the public 
performance of  a musical work, however, the statutory definition of  when a work is performed 
“publicly” appears broad enough to include a restaurant so long as it is “open to the public” or “a 
substantial number of  persons outside of  a normal circle of  a family and its social acquaintances” 
can gather there. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ([date]). Whether “Happy Birthday To You” is in fact still subject to 
copyright is subject to some uncertainty, see Litman, Sharing, supra note 73, at 50 and footnote 111; 
Scott M. Martin, The Mythology Of  The Public Domain: Exploring The Myths Behind Attacks On 
The Duration Of  Copyright Protection, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 253, 322, footnote 61 (2002). 
157. Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (the 
law has never recognized an author’s right to absolute control of  his work). 
158. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 117 authorizes the owner of  a copy of  a computer 
program to make a copy or adaptation of  the program as an essential step in the utilization of  the 
computer program, subject to certain limitations. The same section also authorizes an archival copy. 
Id. 
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only a small fraction of  the what the public is in fact entitled to do with copyrighted material 
in the private sphere.159 As discussed earlier, the obsolescence of  the AHRA illustrates the 
difficulties of  effectively addressing these issues before they occur and the likelihood that 
existing solutions quickly become stale in the context of  fast-changing technology and 
consumer behavior.160 Clearly, the limitations that affect option 3 apply with at least equal 
force to option 4, but the consequences may even greater because of  the different default 
rule.  
In the majority of  cases, instead of  attempting to specify the circumstances in which 
private uses would or would not constitute copyright infringement, Congress has “taken the 
fifth” and left it to the courts to make that determination on a case-by-case basis by applying 
the fair use doctrine.  
Judges are of  course entitled to question the wisdom of  congressional delegation, 
both in relation to private sphere copying and more generally. Nonetheless, until Congress 
enacts more detailed policy, judges are stuck with making most of  the hard decisions. The 
question is, how should they make them? 
As discussed in Part I, the four factors contained in the statutory elaboration of  the 
fair use doctrine should be seen as question-framing as opposed to outcome-determinative. 
Congress has given the courts a framework for deciding fair use cases, however it is still the 
responsibility of  the courts to determine the scope of  the copyright owner’s rights in 
particular situations. This explains one half  of  the structural role of  fair use, that it is a 
standard that shifts policy making responsibility from the legislature to the judiciary.  
Structurally, the flexible and dynamic nature of  fair use renders it both the counter-
weight to, and the enabler of, the equally flexible and dynamic exclusive rights of  copyright 
owners. The structural role of  fair use allows the judiciary to adapt copyright law in response 
to new technologies or other external forces. This is especially significant given the broad 
expression of  copyright owners’ exclusive rights in the 1976 Act, and the increased breadth 
and duration of  copyright protection brought about by the abandonment of  formalities such 
as copyright registration, notice and renewal.  
One of  the more interesting implications of  the structural role of  fair use is that fair 
use actually benefits copyright owners as a class by facilitating a more expansive definitions 
of  their rights. This suggests that judges should disregard theories that view fair use as 
merely a tax on copyright owners, or an ad hoc redistribution of  entitlements. It also 
suggests that judges need to carefully consider the allocation of  the burden of  proof  in 
where the defendant raises fair use as a defense to copyright infringement. The 
jurisprudential implications of  the structural role of  fair use are considered in the next 
section. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
159. In addition to the fair use examples already mentioned in this paper, it should be 
noted that “[n]o license is required by the Copyright Act, for example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in 
the shower.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975). 
160. See notes 103–105 and accompanying text, supra.  
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Part IV—Jurisprudential Implications 
Judges can not avoid making copyright policy in fair use cases. As discussed in the 
preceding sections, the indeterminacy of  the statutory fair use factors, and the reluctance (or 
inability) of  the legislature to enact specific rules in response to technological and social 
changes affecting copyright, necessitates that judges fill in the substantial gaps in copyright 
law.  
How should judges make sense of  the jumble of  case law and theory of  the last 200 
years? The preceding structural analysis of  fair use suggests that Congress has decided that 
the indeterminacy of  a flexible fair use standard is preferable to the potential rigidity of  
anything more specific. The Supreme Court has also stressed the benefits of  flexibility in its 
admonition to avoid the application of  bright-line rules in fair use.161 Given this 
indeterminacy, how can judges decide fair use cases in a principled and non-arbitrary way? 
A comprehensive survey of  the literature addressing this question is beyond the 
scope of  this article. Nonetheless, it is possible to parse the majority of  the literature into 
three different schools of  thought: the cost-benefit analysis school; the external normative 
framework school; and the internal normative framework school. The meaning of  these 
labels will become apparent shortly.  
A. Existing Approaches to Determining Fair Use 
The essence of  a cost-benefit analysis approach to fair use is a comparison of  the 
costs versus the benefits of  allowing the unauthorized use to continue. However, this simple 
statement belies the complexity and diversity of  opinions as to exactly how such a test might 
be implemented. Wendy Gordon, for example, proposes that a finding of  fair use should be 
conditioned on the presence of  market failure and a cost-benefit analysis that indicates a net 
gain in social value in allowing the unauthorized use to continue.162 In contrast to Gordon, 
Glynn Lunney proposes a pure form of  cost-benefit analysis without the filter of  market 
failure.163 Elsewhere I have undertaken a detailed examination of  competing law and 
economics analyses of  fair use.164  A few preliminary observations are worth making. First, 
viewing fair use as market failure necessarily characterizes fair use as an exception the norm 
of  unbounded copyright rights. As has been shown, fair use plays a fundamental role in both 
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161. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) 
162. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of  the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1614 (1982). Gordon initially 
proposed a further requirement that “an award of  fair use would not cause substantial injury to the 
incentives of  the plaintiff  copyright owner.” However, Gordon herself  has subsequently retreated 
from that very limiting proposition.  See Gordon, The “Market Failure” And Intellectual Property: A 
Response To Professor Lunney, 82 B.U.L. Rev. 1031, 1032 (2002). Gordon also stresses that market 
failure is not confined to transactions costs (as many have assumed) but incorporates, informational 
asymmetries, endowment effects and negative externalities as well. Id.  
163. Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975 
(2002). 
164. Matthew Sag, The Law And Economics Of  Fair Use (2005) (working paper, on file 
with author).  
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bounding and thereby enabling expansive copyright rights; fair use is more than an ad hoc 
exception to market failure. Second, cost-benefit analysis asks judges to undertake a difficult 
and speculative factual inquiry. In that context, allocation of  burden of  proof  is likely to be 
more outcome-determinative than the actual costs and benefits themselves. Third, even if  a 
case-by-case cost-benefit analysis were feasible, its administrative costs may well overshadow 
any gains in allocative efficiency that it achieves. Consequently, cost-benefit analysis, with or 
without a prerequisite of  market failure, provides little guidance to judges as to how to 
actually decide fair use cases.  
In contrast to the exacting methodology of  the cost-benefit approach, a number of  
judges and scholars have suggested that fair use decisions should be made primarily with 
recourse to normative conceptions of  “the good.”165 Perhaps the most well known 
proponent of  this analysis is William Fisher. Fisher proposes reconstructing the fair use 
doctrine to “advance a substantive conception of  a just and attractive intellectual culture” – a 
vision of  “the good life and the sort of  society that would facilitate its widespread 
realization.”166 To achieve this goal, Fisher extrapolates a set of  preferences from various 
schools of  political philosophy.167 While Fisher’s proposal is thoughtfully developed, it 
nonetheless amounts to little more than a collection of  thinly substantiated preferences,168 
reflecting one man’s vision of  the good life.169  
Whether viewed as a subsidy or an entitlement, resorting to normative orderings as a 
guide for implementing fair use is problematic for at least three reasons. First and most 
obvious is the difficulty of  locating an objective basis for any particular ordering. Second, 
reliance on preference orderings could easily generate perverse results. For example, allowing 
a generous scope for fair use in a particular market, such as education materials, might 
reduce incentives for production in that very market. Third, applying fair use based on 
preference orderings as opposed to conduct is not a close fit with the objectives of  
copyright, expressed in the Constitution as the encouragement of  the progress of  science 
and the useful arts, not the progress of  scientists and useful artists.  
Commentators such as Lloyd Weinreb and Michael Madison advocate a variation of  
grounding fair use decisions on orderings of  social preferences.170 They argue that fair use 
                                                                                                                                                                             
165. See Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Merges, supra note 132, at 132–35 (advocates express recognition of  fair 
use as both a tax on copyright owners and a subsidy in favor of  certain classes of  users) 
166. William W. Fisher, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661, 
1744 (1988). 
167. Id. at 1745–1762. 
168. Fisher’s preference for symphonies over television being one example. Id. at 1768. 
169. See Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1305 (“To concede that the vision is 
utopian is not enough, for the vision that Professor Fisher presented is only one utopian vision 
among a great many.”) 
170. Michael Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm and Mary L. 
Rev. 1525 (2004) (calling for more explicit acknowledgment of  the role of  “favored practices” and 
“accepted patterns” in fair use analysis); Lloyd L. Weinreb Fair’s Fair: A Comment On The Fair Use 
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should concentrate on accepted norms and customary practice as the basis for determining 
the scope of  the copyright owner’s legitimate interests. Relying on the wisdom of  the past 
assumes that those norms and practices were appropriate to begin with and are applicable 
now, both of  which may be incorrect. Furthermore, as technology and society continue to 
change, it will always be contested whose accepted norms should be applied or which 
customary practice is most applicable.  
For example, file-sharers argue that their activities are consistent with an ethic of  
sharing and past practices, such as recording and sharing mixed tapes. They equate file-
sharing with norms of  individual autonomy which thrive on the internet, such as self-
expression, and creative collaboration.171 The recording industry argues that there is no 
precedent for consumers making perfect substitutes for the industry’s products, and that 
legitimate sharing has never allowed wholesale copying.172 Opponents of  file-sharing equate 
it with theft and argue that it threatens the livelihoods of  authors, artists, and a multi-billion-
dollar-a-year industry. Both sides in this debate rely on the virtue of  preexisting, but 
inconsistent, norms and practices; this illustrates that reliance on existing norms and 
practices provides little guidance to judges in deciding fair use conflicts.  
The third approach to answering this question looks at the fundamental principles 
underlying copyright law itself. Looking to the institution of  copyright itself  for the 
assumptions necessary to form fair use analysis is preferable to an unbounded normative 
inquiry precisely because it is limited. In spite of  its non-statutory nature, transformative use 
has quickly become the dominant factor in fair use analysis.173 The Supreme Court derived 
the transformative use test from its understanding of  the purpose of  copyright law itself. As 
the Court explained, the goal of  copyright is the promotion of  science and the arts, and that 
in turn requires some freedom for present authors to build on the works of  the past. 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if  any, 
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. 
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily 
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before. No man 
creates a new language for himself, at least if  he be a wise man, in writing a 
book. He contents himself  with the use of  language already known and used 
and understood by others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, 
unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of  others. The thoughts of  every 
man are, more or less, a combination of  what other men have thought and 
expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own 
genius or reflection.174  
                                                                                                                                                              
Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137 (1990), (fairness as compliance with accepted norms and 
customary practice). 
171. Netanel, supra note 152, at 2. 
172. Id.
173. Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding The Transformative Use Test For 
Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 579, 597 (2000). 
174. Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 
1845); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).  
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From this foundation the Court concluded that transformative works—any work 
which “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message” to the original—deserve special recognition in 
fair use.175  
This paper has proposed a structural understanding of  fair use as the mechanism 
through which Congress has transferred a significant policy making to the judiciary. Judges 
should recognize fair use decisions as a policy making exercise; however, they should also be 
cognizant of  the appropriate limits of  policy making in that context. Specifically, judges 
should work within the framework that Congress has given them, and that framework is the 
law of  copyright.  
Transformative uses are given preference under the theory that encouraging the 
production of  new works that embrace and extend existing works benefits society. The 
unstated assumption here is either that transformative uses are inherently good or that 
transformative uses are more likely than non-transformative uses to be welfare enhancing. 
Both of  these assumptions are consistent with the Constitutional mandate for copyright, 
which is the promotion of  the progress of  science and useful arts, as opposed to the 
promotion of  public welfare in general.176 Although the preamble does not create a 
substantive limitation on congressional power,177 it nonetheless informs our understanding 
of  what copyright is and how the copyright system is supposed to function.  
Until now, this approach has been confined to the concept of  transformativeness. 
But it follows from this article’s structural analysis that the third approach can be expanded 
to incorporate other principles from copyright law. Although these principles are also 
normative, they have greater legitimacy as they are based in doctrinal principles, not just 
individual preferences. Additionally, these doctrinal norms are at least loosely based on 
congressional preferences since they are drawn from copyright law and its constitutional 
mandate.  
B. A New Approach: Applying Copyright Principles to Animate Fair Use  
Judge Pierre Leval has urged courts to make transformative use the predominant 
factor in their analysis and to “resist the impulse to import extraneous policies.” 
Nonetheless, the limitations of  transformativeness suggest that other factors must also be 
considered. Limiting judicial discretion to principles inherent within copyright itself  makes 
sense, but transformative use is not the only animating principle from within copyright law 
to which judges should look.  
Transformative use is far from the end of  the fair use inquiry. There are a number of  
uses that do not appear to be transformative, but are nonetheless fair use. For example, 
transformative use does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the fair use status of  
untransformative reproduction of  materials for use in the classroom provided for in Section 
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175. Id. at 579. 
176. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
177. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003). Nimmer observes that “In fact, the 
introductory phrase, rather than constituting a limitation on congressional authority, has for the most 
part tended to expand such authority.” 1–1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03.  
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107 itself.178 Nor can it explain the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sony that noncommercial time-
shifting of  broadcast television is fair use. Transformative use also fails to provide a 
convincing explanation of  the fair use status of  reverse engineering of  computer software, 
discussed in detail below.  
In addition to these omissions, transformative use also has an ambiguous 
relationship with derivative works. As Jeremy Kudon has observed, the definition of  
derivative work appears to entirely overlap with the concept of  transformative use.179 
Distinguishing between infringing derivative works and transformative works requires some 
concept of  what the appropriate boundaries of  the copyright owner’s derivative rights 
should be. Transformativeness appears to be a conclusion rather than a test. Finally, because 
transformativeness typically applies to critical works such as parody or review, a number of  
scholars have expressed concern that transformativeness has made some kind of  critical 
element a necessary prerequisite for fair use.180  
These criticisms do not imply that transformativeness is an inappropriate guiding 
principle; rather they show that it can not be the only guiding principle elaborating the 
meaning and application of  fair use. Other fundamental principles of  copyright have a role 
to play in fleshing out fair use, once fair use’s structural role is understood. Three key 
principles from copyright that may also play an animating role in fair use are: the idea 
expression distinction, consumer autonomy and medium neutrality.  
1. The Idea Expression Distinction 
Copyright is celebrated as the “engine of  free expression” because of  the incentives 
it establishes for the creation and dissemination of  information.181 However, the efficiency 
of  that engine depends on the effectiveness of  the idea expression distinction. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Harper & Row, the idea expression distinction “strikes a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free 
communication of  facts while still protecting an author’s expression.”182 Where particular 
situations and advances in technology threaten to undermine the idea expression distinction, 
courts have applied fair use to reinforce this copyright principle.  
Cases addressing the reverse engineering of  computer software illustrate the 
importance of  applying fair use to preserve the idea expression distinction. Computer 
programs are written in source code, a human readable language, but they are typically 
                                                                                                                                                                             
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ([date]). “Notwithstanding the provisions of  sections 106 and 106A 
the fair use of  a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of  copyright.” 
179. Kudon, supra 173, at 592. A problem acknowledged but unresolved in Lavel’s 
original formulation. See Leval, supra note 29, at 1111–1112. 
180. Bunker, supra note 114, at 17. 
181. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
182. Id. at 556. 
U of M Law School Publications Center, April 28, 2005, 1:49 PM 
Page 37 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
MTTLR 11-2 Edit Format Document GITM MTTLR Version 
 
distributed in object code which is only readable by computers.183 The object code 
distributed on a compact discs or in the memory of  a video game consoles is protected by 
copyright,184 and yet the same object code also contains ideas and performs functions that 
are not entitled to copyright protection.185 Unlike other copyright protected works, the 
unprotectable elements of  computer programs distributed in object code are hidden from 
view. With the right tools, experienced programmers can extract the unprotectable elements 
from object code, however these methods almost invariably require making an unauthorized 
copy, or multiple unauthorized copies, of  the program.  
Federal courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of  a computer 
program as a necessary step in reverse engineering is fair use.186 The Ninth Circuit reverse 
engineering case of  Sony v. Connectix,187 illustrates the centrality of  preserving the idea 
expression distinction and promoting legitimate competition. From the beginning of  its 
decision, the court emphasized the importance of  the idea expression distinction: “[W]e are 
called upon once again to apply the principles of  copyright law to computers and their 
software, to determine what must be protected as expression and what must be made 
accessible to the public as function.188”  
Consistent with its decision in Sega,189 the court held that intermediate copying of  
software could be protected as fair use if  the copying was necessary to gain access to the 
functional elements of  the software.190 The court based its ruling firmly in the importance of  
maintaining the idea expression distinction. “We drew this distinction because the Copyright 
Act protects expression only, not ideas or the functional aspects of  a software program. … 
Thus, the fair use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements 
embedded in copyrighted computer software programs.”191  
                                                                                                                                                                             
183. Source code is translated into a set of  instructions for a particular type of  machine 
through a process known as compilation. The resulting object code consists literally of  a long 
sequence of  ones and zeros that is then capable of  running on a machine; to say that object code is 
‘read’ by the machine does not imply that it is comprehended. For a more detailed discussion see, 
Daniel Lin, Matthew Sag & Ron S. Laurie, Source Code Versus Object Code, 18 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 235. 
184. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ([date]). 
185. Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
186. E.g., Sony, 203 F.3d at 602 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); Atari 
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of  Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); see also David Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption 
After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 595, 598, (2004) footnote 19 for further 
references. 
187. , 203 F.3d 596. 
188. Id. at 598.  
189. Sega, 977 F.2d 1510.  
190. Sony, 203 F.3d at 604; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524–26. 
191. Sony, 203 F.3d at 603. 
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The Ninth Circuit decided that the first fair use factor, the nature and purpose of  the 
use, favored the defendant in this case because it deemed reverse engineering to be legitimate 
purpose, based on its understanding of  the requirements of  the idea expression 
distinction.192 To comply with the perceived requirement that all fair uses must be 
transformative, the court unconvincingly asserted that the defendant’s product was 
“modestly transformative,”193 a conclusion based solely on characteristics of  the defendant’s 
non-infringing end product rather than its intermediate copying. The court was distorting 
the concept of  transformativeness because it clearly considered that fair use should apply to 
reverse engineering. If  the court had recognized that other principles of  copyright can guide 
the application of  fair use, not just transformativeness, these judicial acrobatics would have 
been unnecessary. The importance of  the idea expression distinction alone should have been 
enough to include reverse engineering within the contours of  fair use.  
The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of  the idea expression distinction was also central 
to its determination of  the market effect of  Connectix’s reverse engineering, the fourth fair 
use factor. The fourth factor requires courts to look beyond the mere presence of  an effect 
on the market or potential market of  the copyright owner and ask whether the market so 
effected is one which copyright protects. In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite plainly 
differentiated the copyright owner’s general economic interests from the limited protection 
afforded by copyright.194 Copyright neither protects the copyright owner from parody, nor 
recognizes a protectable derivative market for criticism in general.195 Just as Campbell 
recognizes that criticism is outside of  the copyright owner’s protectable sphere of  interest, 
the reverse engineering cases recognize that the copyright owner has no protectable interest 
in preventing the copying of  unprotectable expression and ideas buried within its object 
code. In Sony v Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although the defendant’s Virtual 
Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the market for gaming platforms 
compatible with Sony games, the Virtual Game Station was a “legitimate competitor” in that 
market.196 The court concluded that Sony’s desire to control the market for gaming 
platforms was “understandable” but that “copyright law … does not confer such a 
monopoly.”197 Principles such as the idea expression distinction inform the a priori 
assumptions that courts must make before they can apply the fair use doctrine in general or 
the four statutory factors in particular.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
192. Id. at 607.  
193. Id. at 606. 
194. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591–592 (1994). 
195. Id. at 592. 
196. Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 
2000); see also, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–23 (9th Cir. 1993). 
197. Sony, 203 F.3d at 607; see also, Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523–24 (An attempt to 
monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory 
purpose of  promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting 
the invocation of  the fair use doctrine). 
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2. Consumer Autonomy 
Justifying fair use in terms of  critical transformative appropriation, or the necessity 
of  maintaining the idea expression distinction, may address the majority of  fair use decisions 
that courts are called on to make. They do not, however, bring us any closer to rationalizing 
the fair use status of  uncritical appropriation, such as consumer time shifting which was the 
subject of  the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony. This subsection speculates that in addition 
to transformativeness and preserving the idea expression distinction, there is a third guiding 
principle that can be read into copyright – consumer autonomy.  
Copyright’s first sale doctrine and significant cases in other areas, such as Sony, 
appear to hinge upon an underlying notion of  consumer autonomy. This principle has not 
been explicitly articulated in the cases, but it is both a normatively appealing concept and it 
provides a principled explanation for a range of  developments. If  consumer autonomy does 
come to be recognized by the courts, it too should be a copyright principle used to elucidate 
fair use. 
To the extent that a principle of  consumer autonomy exists, it is based on a 
combination of  the first sale doctrine and the omission of  “use” from the exclusive rights of  
the copyright owner. Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
distribute a work is limited to its first sale, and the owner of  a copy of  a work is entitled to 
sell or otherwise dispose of  that copy without permission from the copyright owner, so long 
as the copy was lawfully made in the first place.198 The copyright owner has the sole right to 
make copies and sell them, but for each copy sold, the owner’s right to control distribution 
of  any particular copy is exhausted by the first sale of  that copy. According to the Supreme 
Court, “[t]he whole point of  the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a 
copyrighted item in the stream of  commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive 
statutory right to control its distribution.”199  
It has been suggested that the first sale doctrine has been weakened by technological 
changes, especially in the realm of  computer software.200 Several courts have now accepted 
the proposition that the transfer of  data from a permanent storage device to a computer’s 
random access memory (“RAM”) constitutes a “copying” for purposes of  copyright law.201 
However, Section 117 of  the Copyright Act limits the exclusive rights of  the copyright 
owner with respect to computer programs. That section provides that the owner of  a copy 
                                                                                                                                                                             
198. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ([date]), but note the exclusions in 109(b).  
199. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 
(1998). 
200. For a nuanced discussion of  the impact of  technology on the first sale doctrine, see 
R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of  Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev 577 
(2003). 
201. Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs. Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). In addition to the DC Circuit 
and the Ninth Circuit, the RAM copying doctrine has been accepted by a number of  lower courts, 
although implicitly rejected by others. See Anthony Reece, The Public Display Right: The Copyright 
Act’s Neglected Solution To The Controversy Over RAM “Copies”, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 83, 139 and 
the cases cited therein.  
U of M Law School Publications Center, April 28, 2005, 1:49 PM 
Page 40 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art4
MTTLR 11-2 Edit Format Document GITM MTTLR Version 
 
of  a program is entitled to load a copy of  that program to the computer’s RAM if  that is “an 
essential step in the utilization of  the computer program in conjunction with a machine.”202 
How far the RAM copying doctrine really extends the right of  copyright owners to 
effectively control the “use” of  their software depends on the proper interpretation the 
Section 117 exemption.203  
The first sale doctrine combined with the absence of  any “use” right in copyright 
allow a strong degree of  autonomy for consumers; copyright owners are generally unable to 
control the use (as opposed to copying) of  their works by the public. For example, the seller 
of  a remotely activated garage door (operated by embedded software) has no right to control 
how many times it is opened or which brand of  garage door opener is used to open it.204 
Similarly, the publisher of  a magazine presumably has no right to control the order in which 
individual copies are read by consumers.  
In the Galoob case,205 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Game Genie, a device 
that enhanced the operation of  the Nintendo gaming platform (by allowing players to move 
differently and have more lives), did not infringe Nintendo’s copyright because it neither 
copied Nintendo’s games nor made derivative works of  them.206 The court declined to 
stretch the definition of  derivative work to include altering the way a video game was played, 
for fear of  chilling innovation in computer applications.207 The court concluded that a 
program or device that improves the performance of  a copyrighted program without 
copying it does not create a derivative work of  the initial program, even if  it changes the way 
the initial program is perceived or displayed.208  
These cases and the first sale doctrine itself  rest on the logic of  a principle of  
consumer autonomy. Nonetheless,the question remains: is there a freestanding principle of  
consumer autonomy that can inform fair use analysis, assuming that one or more of  the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights appear to have been infringed? Sony sheds some light on 
this question. 
In Sony, the majority explained that although consumers who engaged in time-
shifting of  broadcast television copied the entire program – a factor that usually weighs 
heavily against fair use – the extent of  their copying did not have its ordinary effect because 
                                                                                                                                                                             
202. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (date). 
203. See generally, 2–8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08. The critical questions in this 
regard are: (1) what rights do consumers have to use third party parts and services in combination 
with copyrighted digital content; (2) what rights do consumers have to modify or upgrade 
copyrighted digital content; and (3) to what extent can copyright owners can bind consumers to 
contractual restrictions that conflict with their rights under the first sale doctrine? As interesting as 
these questions are, this is not the place to address them. 
204. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
205. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of  Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
206. Id. at 969. 
207. Id.
208. Id.
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“time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to 
witness in its entirety free of  charge.”209 In other words: once a copyrighted work is lawfully 
placed into the hands of  a consumer, the consumer is free to consume the product as she 
chooses, regardless of  whether the copyright owner would prefer that she consume in some 
other fashion.  
The same logic was applied in Galoob, where the Ninth Circuit held that even if  the 
Game Genie created a derivative work (they held it did not), consumers were nonetheless 
entitled to use the Game Genie in conjunction with games they had lawfully acquired.210 In 
both Sony and Galoob, the courts held that copyright owner’s exclusive rights did not reach 
so far as to control the precise manner in which consumers used their works, provided that 
consumers paid the going price.  
A principle of  consumer autonomy is also evident in Recording Industry Association 
of  America’s (“RIAA”) ill-fated challenge to portable MP3 players.211 The RIAA sought to 
enjoin the manufacture and distribution of  Diamond Rio’s MP3 player, alleging that it did 
not meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the AHRA.212 As a 
matter of  statutory interpretation, the court held that the AHRA did not apply to either a 
computer hard-drive, or a device that merely received files from a computer hard-drive.213 In 
passing, the court commented on the purpose of  the AHRA, which it viewed as “the 
facilitation of  personal use.”214 The court adopted the words of  the House report, explaining 
that the AHRA’s home taping exemption, “protects all noncommercial copying by 
consumers of  digital and analog musical recordings.”215 Echoing Sony, the court analogized 
transferring music from a CD to a portable MP3 player to recording broadcast television for 
the purpose of  time-shifting. “The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 
‘space-shift,’ those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Such copying is 
paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of  the 
Act.”216  
                                                                                                                                                                             
209. Sony Corp. of  America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-450 (1984). 
210. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 971 (consumers are not invited to witness 
Nintendo’s audiovisual displays free of  charge, but, once they have paid to do so, the fact that the 
derivative works created by the Game Genie are comprised almost entirely of  Nintendo’s 
copyrighted displays does not militate against a finding of  fair use). 
211. Recording Indus. Ass’n of  Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
212. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)(1), (2) (digital audio recording device required to conform to 
the Serial Copy Management System); Recording Indus. Ass’n of  Am., 180 F.3d 1072. 
213. Id. at 1078–1079.  
214. Id. at 1079; see also Senate report, “the purpose of  [the Act] is to ensure the right 
of  consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of  copyrighted music for their private, 
noncommercial use.” S. Rep. No. 102-294, at *86. 
215. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 ([date]), see H.R. Rep. No. 102-873(I), at *59. 
216. Recording Indus. Ass’n of  Am., 180 F.3d at 1079 (citation & quote omitted). 
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The idea of  consumer autonomy as a guiding principle for fair use can, of  course, be 
taken too far. There is an important distinction to made between consumer autonomy for 
consumers acting as consumers as opposed to consumers acting as potential rivals of  the 
copyright owner. In Napster, the district court held that the copying which the file-sharing 
service facilitated did not qualify as “personal use in the traditional sense.”217 The district 
court saw “critical differences” between Napster’s try-then-buy argument218 and the use of  
VCRs for time-shifting. An individual Napster user “who downloads a copy of  a song to her 
hard drive may make that song available to millions of  other individuals, even if  she 
eventually chooses to purchase the CD,”219 whereas time-shifting broadcast television or 
space-shifting music to a portable device does not distribute the copyrighted work beyond 
the intended user. On appeal the Ninth Circuit similarly distinguished the “shifting” analyses 
of  Sony and Diamond because of  the difference between personal use and distribution of  
the work.220 So, clearly multiple courts are at least implicitly adopting an underlying concept 
of  consumer autonomy.  
Copyright law allows some forms of  price discrimination, such as temporal market 
segmentation and versioning. For example, high priced hardcover books are released earlier 
than cheaper paperbacks and are also more durable. Yet copyright and other laws generally 
limit the content owner’s control of  her products once released into the stream of  
commerce,221 so there is clearly no absolute right to price discriminate. At any rate, before 
they can fully embrace the notion of  consumer autonomy, courts should consider whether 
the copyright owner has an interest in price discrimination that outweighs considerations of  
consumer autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some support for the notion of  consumer 
autonomy as a fundamental principle of  copyright; indeed it is difficult to explain the 
evidentiary presumptions applied in Sony on any other theory.  
3. Medium Neutrality 
Finally, in addition to copyright’s preference for transformative uses, maintaining the 
idea expression distinction and (possibly) preserving consumer autonomy, fair use analysis 
should also recognize the importance of  medium neutrality. Medium neutrality is the 
principle that a use should not receive less protection, simply by virtue of  being expressed in 
a different medium.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
217. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
218. Napster argued that unauthorized file-sharing did not have an adverse market effect 
on copyright owners because file-sharers might become consumers after sampling music on-line. 
219. A & M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
220. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). (“Both 
Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of  shifting in these cases did not also 
simultaneously involve distribution of  the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or 
space-shifting of  copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original user.”) 
221. For example, antitrust law prohibits resale price maintenance. For a more detailed 
discussion of  the uncertain case for price discrimination in the context of  intellectual property, see 
James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital 
Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2007 (2000). 
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Medium neutrality is not a principle inherent to copyright in the same way as those 
listed above; however, it provides a useful reality check against importing unwarranted 
assumptions as to the illegitimacy of  non-mainstream points of  view and non-mainstream 
vehicles of  expression. There is no reason to reject the unequal treatment of  different media 
of  expression out of  hand, but unless Congress has indicated a preference for or against a 
particular medium, courts should at least be suspicious of  analysis that leads to unequal 
treatment.  
Again, the reverse engineering cases provide support for the idea of  medium 
neutrality in the sense of  preserving the idea expression distinction in computer software. 
The abstract idea of  a storyline is not protected by copyright, even though it is contained in 
the text of  a protected novel; nor are facts, dates and historical events, even if  they are 
contained in a protected history book. Medium neutrality dictates that uncopyrightable 
programming structures and APIs should not receive special protection by virtue of  being 
released in object code which makes them unreadable to humans. Consistent with the 
principle of  medium neutrality, courts allow reverse engineering of  object code to discover 
these unprotectable elements.  
Computer software is not exceptional in this regard; even within more conventional 
media, there is a strong case for a presumption of  neutrality. For example, a recent Eleventh 
Circuit decision, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,222 indicates that courts attempt to 
accord equal treatment and respect to all forms of  criticism, even if  some necessitate more 
copying than others. In that case, the court ruled that Alice Randall’s retelling of  “Gone 
With The Wind” (“GWTW”) from the perspective of  Scarlet’s African-American half-sister 
was clearly a criticism and a parody of  the original. Using this literary device as the vehicle 
for her rejoinder to the perceived racism of  GWTW223 required Randall to appropriate much 
more of  the original than would have been required for other methods, such as a literary 
essay.  
In a very strong statement suggesting the importance of  medium neutrality, the 
Eleventh Circuit held: “The fact that Randall chose to convey her criticisms of  GWTW 
through a work of  fiction, which she contends is a more powerful vehicle for her message 
than a scholarly article, does not, in and of  itself, deprive TWDG of  fair-use protection.”224  
The court held that even though Randall had made extensive use of  characters, plot 
points and settings in GWTW, her work was capable of  fair use protection because the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
222. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
223. Id. at 1269–1270. (“In the world of  GWTW, the white characters comprise a noble 
aristocracy whose idyllic existence is upset only by the intrusion of  Yankee soldiers, and, eventually, 
by the liberation of  the black slaves. Through her characters as well as through direct narration, 
Mitchell describes how both blacks and whites were purportedly better off  in the days of  slavery: 
“The more I see of  emancipation the more criminal I think it is. It’s just ruined the darkies,” says 
Scarlett O’Hara. Free blacks are described as “creatures of  small intelligence . . . like monkeys or 
small children turned loose among treasured objects whose value is beyond their comprehension, 
they ran wild—either from perverse pleasure in destruction or simply because of  their ignorance.”) 
(citations omitted).  
224. Id. at 1269. 
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extent of  that borrowing was required by the critical genre she had chosen.225 What separates 
Randall’s work from mere fan fiction is its critical element – the court was convinced that 
Randall’s book was “principally and purposefully a critical statement.”226 Based on that 
conviction it was willing to allow Randall enough freedom to achieve her critical purpose in 
her chosen medium. This lends support to the argument that medium neutrality is an 
important copyright principle, and so should be incorporated into fair use analysis. 
C. Assessment 
Fair use would be much more certain and much easier to administer if  Congress had 
formulated policy more completely and given courts a set of  bright-line rules to follow. 
Instead, Congress has relieved itself  of  the burden of  difficult decisions and left the 
judiciary to apply a vague and open ended standard. The merits of  this choice are debatable, 
but the consequences for judges in fair use cases seem clear – they have no choice but to 
engage in policy making.  
In this paper I have suggested that in order to make policy in relation to fair use, 
judges should restrict themselves to one toolkit – principles derived from copyright law. This 
approach lacks the lure of  simple and immediate answers offered by a cost-benefit analysis, 
but it is a far more realistic exercise to expect judges to undertake, given the limits of  judicial 
resources and the speculative nature of  any case-by-case empirical inquiry. The approach 
suggested here must also be contrasted against that of  encouraging courts to justify their 
assumptions in terms of  an unlimited normative inquiry, or the closely related proposition 
of  accepted norms and customary practice. Confining a judge’s search for grounding 
assumptions to principles she can justify in terms of  copyright law itself  is still a normative 
exercise, but it is a sharply more limited one. These limits are important because they will, 
over time, lead to the development of  a more stable and predictable fair use jurisprudence.  
Conclusion 
Deus ex machina, literally “god from the machine,” refers to the resolution of  an 
apparently insoluble crisis through divine intervention. In ancient Greek dramas, an 
intervening god was often brought on stage by an elaborate piece of  equipment; thus the 
expression, god from the machine. Fair use is the god in the copyright machine. Unlike the 
Greek gods, who were unconstrained by reality, fair use does not dissolve the inherent 
conflict arising from opposing interests, but it is the mechanism for their resolution. 
Law and technology interact with consequences that are fundamentally 
unpredictable. What is predictable is that copyright law will need to be continually adapted to 
the demands of  changing circumstances. Fair use plays a vital role in the copyright system by 
facilitating change. The flexibility of  both the rights of  copyright owners, and the fair use 
that can be made of  copyrighted works, stems from Congress’ delegation of  policy-making 
responsibility to the judiciary. Fair use is the structure through which the conflict between 
the needs for certainty and adaptability can be resolved. 
Fair use has a curious and misunderstood relationship with the rights of  copyright 
owners. Many emphasize fair use’s role in limiting those rights. However, the fair use 
                                                                                                                                                                             
225. Id. at 1267. 
226. Id. at 1270. 
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doctrine has also enabled the expansion of  copyright rights, precisely because it establishes a 
flexible boundary on those rights. Historically, and in a contemporary setting, fair use has 
benefited copyright owners by facilitating a more expansive and dynamic definition of  their 
rights than would be otherwise possible.  
Those who see fair use as stemming the tide of  copyright expansion are bound to be 
disappointed. Congress has seen fit to radically expand the application, duration and scope 
of  rights associated with copyright; there is little point wishing the courts would apply the 
fair use doctrine in order to derail this agenda. Nonetheless, fair use remains an important 
counter-weight to the broad rights of  copyright owners. Properly applied, fair use ensures 
significant freedom for criticism, commentary, reference, innovation and experimentation. 
Congress has delegated substantial policy making discretion to judges so that they can apply 
fair use in this fashion, as changing circumstances require. Thus fair use is actually working 
as intended: fair use is not a failed protector of  the status quo, but rather it is a successful 
agent of  change.  
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